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DESPERATE TIMES AND DESPERATE MEASURES: THE
TROUBLED STATE OF THE ORDINARY COURSE OF
BUSINESS DEFENSE-AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
Lawrence Ponoroff*
Julie C. Ashby**
Abstract. The ordinary course of business defense to the bankruptcy trustee's preference
avoiding power has been controversial since its enactment in 1978. Burdened with a cryptic
legislative history concerning its underlying goals, this preference exception has gone through
multiple reinterpretations at the hands of Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court. In recent
years, faced with a potentially expansive reading of the ordinary course defense that
threatened to eclipse the rule, courts have used the "ordinary business terms" element of the
defense to engraft an objective requirement that the party asserting the defense establish
conformity of the challenged transfer with prevailing industry standards. Although deeply
concerned about the expansive application of section 547(c)(2), the authors are critical of the
industry terms requirement, concluding that it is incompatible with the goals of the ordinary
course of business defense. Focusing on what they contend is the most defensible justification
for an ordinary course defense, namely, to encourage creditors to continue to do business with
a financially beleaguered debtor, the authors offer a practical proposal for rewriting section
547(c)(2). By deliberately reorienting the focus to the specific debtor/creditor relationship,
and reintroducing a temporal requirement into the analysis, the authors maintain that this
proposal cures the weaknesses in the statute as presently applied and harmonizes the scope of
the exception with its primary purposive objective and preference policy in general.
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The Ordinary Course of Business Defense

I.

INTRODUCTION

Nothing, it seems, is ordinary about section 547(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code.' While the so-called "ordinary course of business"
defense2 has always engendered controversy,3 two major events have
justified increased attention to this provision in recent years. First, in
1984, Congress eliminated as an element of the defense the requirement
1. The current law of Bankruptcy is found in Title 11 of the U.S. Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1994). Its foundation is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(effective Oct. 1, 1979) [hereinafter Reform Act]. The Reform Act, as amended, is commonly
referred to as the "Bankruptcy Code" or the "Code," a convention that is followed in this work, such
that references to the "Bankruptcy Code" or the "Code" are to Title 11 of the U.S. Code as amended
through October 22, 1994, the effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994) (H.R. 5116) [hereinafter 1994 Amendments]. The 1994
Amendments did not modify or otherwise affect the ordinary course of business defense.
2. Section 547(c)(2) provides that the trustee may not avoid a transfer as a preference:
(2) to the extent that such transfer was(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and
(3)

made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee; and

(C) made according to ordinary business terms.
I1 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2). Throughout this Article, § 547(c)(2) is referred to interchangeably as "the
exception" and "the defense." This use is in accord with prevailing custom, although technically
§ 547(c)(2), like all of the provisions of § 547(c), is an affirmative defense, and not a mere
exception. See Marschack v. Orange Commercial Credit (In re National Lumber & Supply), 184
B.R. 74, 78 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).
3. The ordinary course of business exception is by far the most litigated of the § 547(c) preference
defenses and has been the source of keen interest to commentators. The following is a
comprehensive, although far from exhaustive, list of the many articles devoted in whole or in part to
§ 547(c)(2). Lissa L. Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The Impact of
the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1987 Duke L.. 78; Barkley Clark, Scheduled Debt Payments as
Preferences: Paradigm of the Plain Meaning Rule, 1 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 7 (1991); Vein
Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 713 (1985);
David J. DeSimone, Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Ordinary Course of Business
Exception Without the 45 Day Rule, 20 Akron L. Rev. 95 (1986); Darrell Dunham & Donald Price,
The End of PreferenceLiabilityfor Unsecured Creditors:New Section 547(c)(2) ofthe Bankruptcy
Code, 60 Ind. L.J. 487 (1985); Michael J. Herbert, The Trustee Versus the Trade Creditor: A
Critique of Section 547(c)(1), (2) & (4) of the Bankruptcy Code, 17 U. Rich. L. Rev. 667, 679-98
(1983); Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 725, 757 (1984);
Lawrence Ponoroff, Evil Intentions and an Irresolute Endorsementfor Scientfic Rationalism:
Bankruptcy Preferences One More Time, 1993 wis. L. Rev. 1439, 1490-95; Charles Jordan Tabb,
Rethinking Preferences, 43 S.C. L. Rev. 981 (1992); Thomas M. Ward & Jay A. Shulman, In
Defense ofthe Bankruptcy Code's RadicalIntegrationofthe PreferenceRules Affecting Commercial
Financing, 61 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 83-85 (1983); Robert XVeisberg, Commercial Morality, the
Merchant Character,and the History of the Voidable Preference,39 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1986).
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that the defendant-creditor establish any temporal nexus between the
incurring of the debt and the preferential payment.' Second, in 1991, the
U.S. Supreme Court interpreted revised section 547(c)(2) as applicable to
protect payments made on long-term debt.' Together, these two events
vastly increased the potential reach of the ordinary course of business
defense. At the same time, perhaps unexpectedly, and almost certainly
inadvertently, they triggered a new appraisal of the exception as courts
and litigators rediscovered the third element of the defense, to wit,
subsection C's requirement that the payment be made according to
"ordinary business terms."6
A provision previously ignored by the courts, the phrase "ordinary
business terms" has now become a major roadblock to many creditors'
ability to retain payments received from a bankruptcy debtor in the
critical ninety-day preference period.7 This result is not, in our
estimation, itself a problem because we believe that, in general, the
preference exceptions ought to be narrowly construed. However, our
reading and analysis of the recent case law suggests to us that there is
presently little, if any, correlation between the transactions excluded
from protection by virtue of the current interpretation of the "ordinary
business terms" requirement in section 547(c)(2)(C) and the orthodoxy
of contemporary preference law and policy.
When interpreting subsection C in its early stages, courts resolved the
issue of "ordinariness" by reference to the similarity or deviance of the
preferential transfer to or from prior transactions between the debtor and
the preferred creditor, which is to say courts looked only for a subjective
showing of normalcy in relation to the debtor and creditor's past
dealings Today, an overwhelming majority of courts have refined their
interpretation of the subsection to require an additional objective
showing of compliance with industry standards before a transfer can

4. See Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
333, § 462(c) [hereinafter 1984 Amendments]. As originally enacted, the ordinary course of business
defense could be invoked only if the preferential transfer was made not more than 45 days after the
debt was incurred. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1978) (repealed 1984). For a detailed discussion of the
repeal, see infra part I.
5. Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 162 (1991).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C). Subsections A and B require, respectively, that the debt be incurred
and that the payment be made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and
the transferee.
7. In the case of insiders, of course, the preference period is extended to one year. 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b)(4)(B) (1994).
8. See infra part IV.A.

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
qualify for protection under the ordinary course defense.9 Within this
requirement of industry standards as proof of ordinary business terms,
however, the circuit courts of appeals are themselves in disagreement
over a number of subsidiary issues including: (1) how to identify the
proper industry;' ° (2) once the industry has been identified, how to define
the proper standards within the industry;" and (3) once the standards
have been defined, what type of evidence is required to establish
compliance with the relevant standards.' 2 This lack of uniformity has
produced some confusion and some quite out-of-the-ordinary results
even for creditors who deal consistently with a particular debtor. More
fundamentally, it has moved the ordinary course of business defense
even further away from its original and most defensible justification,
namely, to promote transactions that do not disturb normal financial
relations and that increase the likelihood that the debtor will be able to
navigate through turbulent financial seas without the need for a costly
put in of uncertain duration in the port of bankruptcy."
The present discordance in the interpretation and application of the
ordinary course of business defense suggests that the timing may be
propitious to reconsider, yet again,' 4 the proper formulation of this
controversial preference defense with a view toward more closely
aligning the operation of the exception with its original consequential
objectives."' At the same time, we believe that such a reformulation
9. See infra part IV.B. This requirement is treated as an independent element of the cause,
separate and distinct from the requirements in subparagraphs A and B. See generally Braunstein v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp. (In re Broderick Co.), No. 92-11974-CJK, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 105, at *21
(Bankr. D. Mass. Jan. 4, 1996).
10. See infra part IV.B.2.a.
11. See infra part IV.B.2.b.
12. See infra part IV.B.2.c.
13. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
14. From the time of its enactment as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 until it was
finally amended by the 1984 Amendments, § 547(c)(2) was the subject of repeated proposals for
amendment. A catalogue of the bills introduced in Congress between 1979 and 1983 proposing
changes to the Code, including the preference statute, are contained in Broome, supra note 3, at 99100 n.101.
15. Although their solutions are different than the ones we offer in this Article, other
commentators also have taken note of the lack of congruence between the goals of the preference
law and the objective interpretation of § 547(c)(2)(C). See Timothy M. Lupinacci, Analyzing
Industry Standards in Defending Preference Actions: Equitable Purpose in Search of Statutory
Clarity, 5 Bankr. L. & Prac. 129 (1996) (recommending deletion of subsection C). A recent student
comment that offers a particularly thoughtful approach can be found in Janet E. Byrne Thabit,
Comment, OrdinaryBusiness Terms: Setting the Standardfor 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C), 26 Loy. U.
Chi. L.J. 473 (1995) (urging abandonment of industry-term compliance in most, but not all, cases,
with determination tied to policy objectives of preference law).
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would enhance the overall coherence of the Code's preference
provisions. To that end, this Article begins by outlining briefly the
development of bankruptcy preferences and the ordinary course of
business exception as originally enacted in the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978. It next explores the judicial interpretations of section 547(c)(2)
both before and after the 1984 Amendments6 and the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1991 decision in Union Bank v. Wolas.
We conclude from this examination that the objective standard in
subsection C, as presently construed, is incompatible with the goals of
the ordinary course of business defense as properly defined, failing to
shield from the trustee's preference power certain kinds of transfers
worthy of protection and, at the same time, insulating irom liability a
range of other wholly undeserving transactions. We then suggest and
evaluate several specific legislative and judicial solutions that have been
proposed in the literature to alleviate some of the present confusion in the
decisional law. Our analysis suggests that certain shortcomings inhere in
each of these proposals. Accordingly, in the final part of this Article we
eventually settle on a compromise approach. It is our belief that this
proposal would cure the most serious deficiencies in the current
incarnation of the statute by reorienting the focus in a manner that
harmonizes the operation of the exception with its originally intended
purpose and with preference policy in general. Equally important, we
also believe that, unlike some of the other solutions that have been
offered, our proposal stands a realistic chance for enactment because of
what we perceive (and hope) would be its broad acceptability among
interested constituencies.
II.

PREFERENCE LAW AND THE ORDINARY COURSE OF
BUSINESS DEFENSE IN THE 1978 BANKRUPTCY CODE

A.

Modern PreferenceLaw Generally

Succinctly, a preference is a pre-bankruptcy transfer of an insolvent
debtor's property to an unsecured creditor that enables that creditor to
enjoy an advantage over other general creditors in the distribution of the
assets of the debtor's bankruptcy estate.'7 In essence, preference law
16. 502 U.S. 151 (1991); see infra part III.
17. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 177 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138 [hereinafter
1978 House Report]. Essentially, a preference is a transfer that favors one cred tor over another. See
Jackson, supra note 3. For a succinct history of Anglo/American preference law, see John C.
McCoid, II, Bankruptcy, Preferences,and Efficiency: An Expression ofDoubt, 67 Va. L. Rev. 249,

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
ensures that the basic bankruptcy objective of equal treatment among
similarly situated creditors is not undermined by eve-of-bankruptcy
transfers that have the effect of permitting one creditor to receive more
than that creditor's ratable share of the debtor's assets.
With the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress significantly
changed the contours of the preference law by moving away from
notions of intent, duty, and moral blameworthiness "to the principle that
'all creditors ought to be treated equally."'' '. This revision of the
259 (1981). Section 541 of the Code defines the property of the estate to include not only "all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case," but also any
interest in property recovered by the trustee under § 550. Id. at 250.
18. Weisberg, supra note 3, at 120 (quoting Ward & Shulman, supra note 3, at 17-18); see also
McCoid, supranote 17, at 259 ("Preference law has thus moved from a notion of debtor fraud [under
the 1978 Code] to a standard of absolute liability .... ."); Jay L. Westbrook, Two Thoughts About
Insider Preferences, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 73, 91-92 (1991) (discussing "formulization" of preference
law).
Under the Code's new preference provision, a trustee (or debtor-in-possession in chapter 11) can
establish an avoidable preference by proving that the transfer was made:
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor,
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of
this title.
11. U.S.C. § 547(b)(1)-(5) (1994).
In addition to the statutory elements, a number of courts impose an additional implied requirement
that the debtor's estate be diminished by the transfer sought to be avoided. Hanson v. McDonald
Meat Co. (In re Kemp Pac. Fisheries, Inc.), 16 F.3d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that
"diminution of the estate" doctrine has been developed to determine whether property transferred by
debtor belongs to debtor for § 547 purposes); Estate of Toyota of Jefferson v. Vallette (In re Toyota
of Jefferson, Inc.), 14 F.3d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining application of subsequent advance
rule in § 547(c)(4) to shield otherwise avoidable transfer from preference recovery on ground that
effect of transactions between debtor and creditor occasioned no diminution of estate, and thus did
not harm other creditors); Buckley v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (In re Interior Wood Prods. Co.), 986 F.2d 228,
231 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that although there is no express statutory requirement, most courts
have found diminution of estate requirement implicit in language of statute); In re Smith, 966 F.2d
1527, 1535 (7th Cir.) ("Courts have... long held that to be avoidable, a transfer must result in a
depletion or diminution of the debtor estate."), cert. dismissed sub nom. Baker & Schultz, Inc. v.
Boyer, 506 U.S. 1030 (1992); Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351,
1355-56 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that fundamental inquiry is whether transfer diminished or depleted
estate); Bergner v. Bank One, Milwaukee (In re Bergner & Co.), 187 B.R. 964, 973 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 1995) (referring to diminishment principle as "akin to a sixth requirement").
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preference law was significant in several critical respects. First, the Code
made it easier to prove that a preferential transfer had occurred than was
the case under the prior Bankruptcy Act. 9 For example, Congress
eliminated the Act's requirement that the trustee in a preference action

establish affirmatively that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the
challenged transfer,2 replacing this element with a presumption of the
debtor's insolvency during the ninety days prior to filing.2' Also, the
Code eschewed the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement that forced
Act trustees to prove that the transferee-creditor knew or had reason to
know of the debtor's insolvency as of the time the transfer occurred.2 By
making it easier for the trustee to avoid preferential transfers, all of the
debtor's creditors were put on a more equal footing in the distribution of
the estate. Thus, preference law shifted "from a policy of avoiding only
those preferential transfers that were made to creditors who had reason to
know of the debtor's insolvency and may have therefore exerted pressure
on the debtor, to a policy of' 23preserving equal distribution, even in the
absence of creditor pressure."
With this shift in emphasis, contemporary preference law shrugged off
the last of its historical ties to the concept of fraud and fraudulent
conveyances.24 The essence of modem preference law is no longer in the

19. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended. References herein to the "Bankruptcy
Act" or the "Act" are, unless otherwise indicated, to the statutory provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 as they existed immediately prior to their repeal in 1978.
20. See Bankruptcy Act § 60a(1), II U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976) (repealed 1978).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 547(0 (1994). The presumption of insolvency exists only for the 90-day period
immediately preceding filing and, therefore, does not apply to the extended insider preference
period. II U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1994).
22. Bankruptcy Act § 60b, II U.S.C. § 96b (1976) (repealed 1978); see also Countryman, supra
note 3, at 725 (noting that under Act, trustee's burden was to prove something about state of mind of
transferee-creditor rather than, under earlier bankruptcy laws, state of mind of debtor).
23. Broome, supra note 3, at 96; see also Isaac Nutovic, The Bankruptc Preference Linvs:
Interpreting Code Sections 547(c)(2), 550(a)(1), and 546(a)(1), 41 Bus. Law. 175, 186 (1985)
("Their purpose is to proscribe those transactions that represent attempts, conscious or unconscious,
to rearrange the distribution scheme that falls into place upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.");
Ward & Shulman, supra note 3, at 16 ("The cornerstone of the new preference section is the
principle of equality of distribution ....
").
24. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Voidable Preferences and Protection of the
Expectation Interest, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 971, 977-78 n.20 (1976) (indicating that, historically, law of
voidable preferences developed as branch of law of fraudulent conveyances); McCoid, supra note
17, at 250. Actually, the last vestige of a subjective component in the preference law was not
eliminated until 1984 when § 547(b)(4)(B) was amended to remove the requirement that the trustee
establish for insider transfers occurring outside of the standard 90-day preference period that the
transferee have had "reasonable cause to believe" the debtor insolvent. 11 U.S.C. § 547 historical
note (1994).

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
preferring, but in the consequence of being preferred." This focus on
preferential effect, rather than on subjective motive or intent, is a
manifestation of the fact that, in defining a voidable preference, the
drafters of the Code decided to give primacy to the policy of equality
among creditors after insolvency as the central justification for the
preference law.26 What was not entirely clear at the inception of the
Code, however, and what remains obscure to the present day, is how that
particular, to the
policy choice relates to the preference defenses, and, in 27
ordinary course of business defense in section 547(c)(2).
B.

The Ordinary Course ofBusiness Exception: Elements and Purpose

Because of the breadth of the Code's preference provisions, and their
perceived harshness to creditors in certain contexts, the Bankruptcy
Reform Act also included several narrow exceptions to the trustee's
avoidance power under section 547(b).28 By and large, the purpose for
these exceptions is to protect transactions that do not result in a
diminution of the estate and, therefore, do not interfere with the
distribution scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.29 Section 547(c)(2) is
25. Lawrence Ponoroff& F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve
of Banlruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 235, 301 (1995)
(describing preferential effect, not intent, as centerpiece of doctrine).
26. Actually, the legislative history identifies both "equality" and "deterrence" as the goals of the
preference law. 1978 House Report, supra note 17, at 177-78 (noting that aims of preference laws
are to ensure equality and to deter wasteful scramble to devour debtor's assets). However, because
an unstated premise of the deterrence rationale is that the creditor is aware of the debtor's financial
peril, the elimination of a state of mind element suggests that the policy of distributive equality has
emerged as predominant. See Tabb, supranote 3, at 986-95.
27. Clearly, certain preference exceptions are explicable precisely in these terms, because they
shield transactions that do not have the effect of permitting one creditor to enjoy an advantage over
similarly situated creditors. However, the rationale for the exceptions is a more complex affair,
implicating other policy objectives. See infra notes 64-65.
28. The exceptions according to their popular names include: (1) contemporaneous exchange; (2)
ordinary course of business; (3) enabling loan; (4) new value; (5) floating lien in inventory and
receivables; (6) statutory lien; (7) alimony maintenance and support payments; and (8) consumer
small value. 11 U.S.C § 547(c) (1992 & Supp. IV 1996). Section 547(c)(7) was added by the 1994
Amendments, while § 547(c)(8) (formerly (7)) was added by the 1984 Amendments. For a detailed
discussion of the six original exceptions, see Countryman, supranote 3, at 738-815.
29. See Nutovic, supra note 23, at 184-86. Other commentators have stated that the exceptions
identify those transactions that are "vorthy," see Ward & Shulman, supra note 3, at 15, but that
rationale is highly suspect in light of the decision not to make preference liability turn on the intent
or knowledge of the parties. In fact, the preference defenses probably cannot be rationalized under
any single explanation. Encouraging creditors to continue to deal with a faltering debtor, sparing
transactions that do not threaten distributive equality, promoting competing public policy aims,
facilitating administrative convenience, and, at some level, protecting innocent transferees are all
considerations that enter into the mix.
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different.3" Under the ordinary course of business exception, a creditor
can successfully fend off a trustee's attempt to avoid a preferential
transfer if it proves that the transfer was:
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee; (B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and (C) made according to
ordinary business terms.3
All three elements must be met in order for a creditor to resist
disgorgement of an otherwise voidable preference,32 and it is generally
accepted that the defense is to be narrowly construed.33
It bears noting that in any case to which section 547(c)(2) applies,
there has been an indisputable diminution of the distributable estate
attributable to a payment made to one of several creditors. The
preferential effect could not be clearer. Therefore, when successfully
invoked, the ordinary course of business defense is squarely in conflict
with the strong "equality among creditors" principle underlying the
preference law.

30. Unlike other preference exceptions when invoked successfully, the ordinary course of
business defense is squarely in conflict with the strong equality-based aims of the preference law.
See generally Ponoroff, supra note 3, at 1490 (describing ordinary course of biusiness exception as
"weakest link in the chain"). Parenthetically, the same can be said of the two exceptions added
subsequent to enactment of the Code, specifically the exceptions for alimony, maintenance, and
support obligations, and the small consumer loan provision in § 547(c)(7) and (8) respectively. At a
minimum this conflict renders both of the exceptions suspect in our view, but tJhat is a subject for
another time.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(A)-(C) (1994). As with all of the preference defenses, the party alleged
to have received the preference bears the burden of proof. I1 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1994); Advo Sys.,
Inc. v. Maxway Corp., 37 F.3d 1044, 1047 (4th Cir. 1994); Clark v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In
re Meridith Hoffman Partners), 12 F.3d 1549, 1553 (10th Cir. 1993). As originally enacted, the
creditor had to prove a fourth element: that the transfer was made not later than 45 days after such
debt was incurred. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1978) (amended 1984). For a more detailed
discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 44-45.
32. See, e.g., Jobin v. Cervanka (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 194 B.R. 496,503 (D. Colo. 1996)
(holding that in order to retain transfer under ordinary course of business exception, all three of
stated elements must be proven); Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas
Pension Fund (In re Jones Truck Lines, Inc.), 196 B.R. 483 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1995); Bergner v.
Bank One (In re Bergner & Co.), 187 B.R 964 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1995). Section 550(a) of the Code
permits the trustee to recover a voidable transfer or its value from the initial transferee, certain
secondary transferees, and any person for whose benefit the transfer was made. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)
(1996).
33. For an example, see Jobin v. McKay (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1339 (10th
Cir. 1996), petition for cert.filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1996) (No. 96-569), and
authorities cited therein.

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
In the face of this apparent antinomy, divergent views exist regarding
the original and the continuing goals of the ordinary course of business
exception. A complete understanding of the reasons for this disharmony,
however, requires at least a basic appreciation for the historical origins of
the ordinary course of business defense. Thus, to set the stage, we take a
brief excursus to examine that historical development.
In terms of pre-Code antecedents, only the defense in section

547(c)(4) for subsequent advances of new value had a direct statutory
analogue under the former Bankruptcy Act.34 Nevertheless, Act cases
developed numerous techniques for limiting the trustee's avoiding
powers in particular circumstances.3 5 Among them was a doctrine
dubbed the "current expense rule. 36 The current expense rule operated
more-or-less as an exception to the antecedent debt element of a voidable
preference because of the view that these transactions should not be
treated as preferences even if they technically so qualified.37 In certain
critical respects, the rule was a logical and necessary reaction to
nineteenth-century American bankruptcy law's fixation on intent to
prefer or gain an advantage as an essential element of a voidable
preference.38 As already observed, section 60b of the Act required the
trustee in a preference action to establish that the transferee-creditor had
"reasonable cause to believe" that the debtor was insolvent at the time
the challenged transaction occurred. 39 This requirement naturally tended
to work to protect regularly recurring payments made in the ordinary

34. See Bankruptcy Act § 60c, 11 U.S.C. § 96(c) (1976) (repealed 1978); Countryman, supra note
3, at 781 (describing operation of what was frequently, but inaccurately, referred to as Act's "net
result rule").
35. See generally Ward & Shulman, supranote 3, at 16.
36. The origins of the rule can be traced back to the "acts of bankruptcy," proof of which was
required in order to initiate an involuntary case. Bankruptcy Act § 3a, 11 U.S.C. § 21a (1976)
(repealed 1978). One of these acts was the making of a preferential transfer as defined in § 60 of the
Act. However, prior to 1952, the petitioning creditors had to establish not just that the payment was
made, but that the debtor intendedto prefer the transferee. See James Angell MacLachlan, Handbook
of the Law of Bankruptcy 44, 52-53 (1956). The current expense rule operated to preclude the
petitioning creditors from establishing the requisite intent where the payment was for a current
expense. See 1 Collieron Bankruptcy § 3.01[3] (James Wm.Moore & Lawrence P. King eds., 14th
ed. 1974).
37. Ward & Shulman, supra note 3, at 19-20 (describing operation of rule as creating "fiction"
that payments were for "current expenses" and not "antecedent debts").
38. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 1009-11; Ward & Shulman, supra note 3, at 20 ("The rationale
behind the 'current expense' cases was the need to protect ordinary course transactions between the
creditor and the financially troubled debtor, irrespective of the creditor's perception of the debtor's
problem.").
39. See supranote 22 and accompanying text; see also Ponoroff, supra note 3, at 1477-78.
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course of business, thus obviating the need for the courts to employ the
current expense rule except in rare cases. Elimination of that requirement
in the drafting of the Code created enormous pressure to incorporate an
alternative mechanism for protecting those creditors who, for the most
part, were small, local suppliers of routine, open account credit.4"
Under the Act, the current expense rule had functioned to protect
payments for essential expenses necessary to maintaining continued
operations even when the creditor had knowledge of the debtor's
precarious financial circumstances and in spite the preferential
advantages attained by the favored creditor. At the same time, however,
the current expense rule also reflected the preference law's strong
concern for equality among creditors inter se. This latter objective was
founded largely on the view because of the contemporaniety of the
allegedly preferential payment to the provision of new value to the
debtor, the payment of a current account did not diminish the debtor's
estate in the same manner as, for example, a payment on a long-term
installment obligation.4 In effect, the courts that applied the rule
considered these arrangements to more closely resemble cash, rather than
credit, transactions.42 Therefore, to permit recovery in these
circumstances would produce a windfall for unsecured creditors, a result
no less contrary to the principle of pro rata distribution than permitting a
payment to one of several similarly situated creditors to stand.
Several commentators regard section 547(c)(2) as a codification of the
current expense rule,43 roughly consistent with the diminution of the
estate principle underlying the preference law and simultaneously
operating as a brake on the trustee's vastly expanded preference avoiding
power under the Code in circumstances where competing policy aims are
implicated. In Union Bank v. Wolas, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
concluded that the connection between the current expense rule and the
ordinary course of business defense was too attenuated to alone justify
limiting application of the defense to trade and other recurring, shortterm debt obligations once the express forty-five day limitation in old
40. See Countryman, supra note 3, at 768-70 (relating legislative history of§ 547(c)(2)).
41. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 157 (1991); Tabb, supra note 3, at 1017. The
diminution of the estate doctrine has long roots in preference jurisprudence, tracing at least as far
back as the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in National Bank v. National Herkhimer Co. Bank, 225
U.S. 178 (1912); see also supra note 18.
42. See Ward & Shulman, supra note 3, at 20.
43. See Broome, supranote 3, at 97; Countryman, supranote 3, at 767-78; Herbert, supra note 3,
at 679; Tabb, supra note 3, at 1011. Obviously, § 547(c)(1) can also find some ancestral roots in the
rule.

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
section 547(c)(2)(B) was congressionally abrogated by the 1984

Amendments.'
As with most questions of policy, some perspective here is essential.
According to the legislative history of the 1978 Code, which it will be
recalled eliminated any state of mind component from the definition of a
voidable preference,4 5 the goal of section 547(c)(2) is to "leave
undisturbed normal financial relations because it does not distract from
the general policy of the preference section to discourage unusual action
by either the debtor or his creditors during the debtor's slide into
' Lamentably, this statement
bankruptcy."46
provides minimal practical
guidance as to which transactions should be protected under the ordinary
course of business provision. As one court observed, "[t]he sparse
legislative history to § 547(c)(2) . . .bestows us with precious little
assistance." ' A few courts, therefore, have articulated a more useful
explanation for the exception: "to be a means of encouraging normal
credit transactions and the continuation of short-term credit dealings with
troubled debtors so as to stall rather than hasten bankruptcy."4'8 The Third
Circuit echoed that expression of purpose in FiberLite Corp. v. Molded
49
Acoustical Products, Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical Products, Inc.),
44. Union Bank v. Wolas 502 U.S. 151, 159 (1991) (noting absence of any textual support for
argument).
45. For an excellent account of the evolutionary process culminating in the eventual elimination
of any mens rea standard in the preference law, see Weisberg, supra note 3, at 13-112. Actually, as
originally enacted, § 547 continued to make the defendant-creditor's state of mind relevant in the
limited circumstance where the trustee challenged a transfer made to an insider more than 90 days
prior to filing, but within the extended one-year period for insiders. Specifically, the Code retained
from the Act the requirement that the insider be shown to have "reasonable cause to believe the
debtor was insolvent" at the time of the transfer. II U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1982). However, this last
remnant of a state of mind component was itself eliminated by the 1984 Amendments.
46. 1978 House Report, supra note 17, at 373; S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 88 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5874 [hereinafter 1978 Senate Report]; see also Moran v. Hong Kong &
Shanghai Banking Corp. (In re Deltacorp.), 179 B.R. 773, 781 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
47. Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc.), 18
F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 1994); McCord v. Venus Foods, Inc. (In re Lan Yik Foods Corp.), 185 B.R.
103-10 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (observing that there is "no precise legal test which may be applied
to determine whether the requirements of section 547(c)(2) have been met").
48. Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp. (In re Fred Hawes Org.), 957 F.2d 239, 243 (6th Cir. 1992);
accord Waldschmidt v. Ranier (In re Fulghum Constr. Corp.), 872 F.2d 739, 743 (6th Cir. 1989);
Fitzpatrick v. Rockwood Water, Wastewater & Natural Gas Sys. (In re Tennessee Valley Steel
Corp.), 201 B.R. 927, 934 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996); In re Magic Circle Energy Corp., 64 B.R. 269,
272 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986). One problem with this stated purpose is its association with shortterm credit, which is more difficult to justify since the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the exception
applied to long-term credit as well. See generally Wolas, 502 U.S. 151. For a critical assessment of
the holding in Wolas, see infra text accompanying note 166.
49. 18 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1994).
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when it stated: "Bankruptcy policy, as evidenced by the very existence of
§ 547(c)(2), is to promote ... continuing relationships on level terms,
relationships which if encouraged will often help businesses fend off an
unwelcome voyage into the labyrinths of a bankruptcy."5
It is clear that the object of section 547(c)(2) as originafy adopted was
to protect recurring, customary credit transactions that would have taken
place in the ordinary course of the debtor's and creditor's businesses
regardless of whether the prospect of a bankruptcy filing was looming or
not.5 ' That negative articulation leaves unanswered, however, the
fundamental question of why it was perceived as important to leave
transactions of this type undisturbed. One possibility is that "ordinary
course" is a talisman of innocence or benign motive, in the sense of lack
of intent to prefer. 2 Under this account, the ordinary course of business

50. Id.at 224 (citing O'Neill v. Nestle Libbys P.R., Inc., 729 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting
that exception encourages creditors to continue conducting business with struggling debtors)); see
also supra note 28.
51. See, e.g., Intercontinental Publications, Inc. v. Perry (In re Intercontinental Publications, Inc.),
131 B.R1 544, 550 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1993); Aguillard v. Bank of Lafayette (In re Bourgeois), 58
B.R. 657, 659 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986). Commentators have expressed an even greater diversity of
views on the subject than the courts. See. e.g., Countryman, supra note 3, at 761-69 (explaining that
it is clear Congress intended only to codify older current expense rule); DeSimone, supra note 3, at
100 ("If preference law applied to pre-bankruptcy ordinary course of business transactions, few
creditors would extend credit to troubled debtors; and without credit, few troLbled debtors could
continue in business."); Herbert, supra note 3, at 669 (observing that § 547(c)(2) was enacted with
problem in mind of encouraging extensions of credit, particularly from trade creditors, to faltering
debtors); Weisberg, supra note 3, at 124-26, argues that:
[T]he exception captures the "norm of protecting the innocuous, like-cash, ordinary course
payments to garden-variety trade creditors. . . . The creditor should be protected for his
nonculpable mental state, even if the reasonable cause standard has been eliminated, where the
situation suggests he engaged in no true creditor grabbing at all, but has received payment
simply resulting from an automatic schedule.
Id.
52. See supra note 38. This tension is also reflected in the split of opinion between the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits over whether payments made by a business engaged in an illegal "Ponzi" scheme can
ever qualify for protection under § 547(c)(2). Compare Sender v. Nancy Elizabeth R. Heggland
Family Trust (In re Hedged-Investments Assocs.), 48 F.3d 470 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling that purposes
of exception are served by permitting application of exception to payments m-,de to noninvestorcreditors) with Danning v. Buzek (In re Bullion Reserve of N. Am.), 836 F.2d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that defense cannot be applied to payments made in course of a Ponzi scheme). See
also Jobin v. McKay (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1340 (10th Cir. 1995) (following
Heggland),petitionfor cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1996) (No. 96-569); Jobin v.
Ripley (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 198 B.R. 800, 806 (D. Colo. 1996) (holding that ordinary
course of business defense is unavailable to investors as distinguished from arms-length creditors);
Jobin v. Cervanka (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 194 B.R. 496, 504 (D. Colo. 1996) (same); Jobin
v. Matthews (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 184 B.R. 136, 140 (D. Colo. 1995) (recognizing
importance of protecting noninvestor creditors in bankruptcy proceedings involving Ponzi scheme).

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
defense serves as a surrogate for the former "reasonable cause to believe"
requirement,53 mitigating the overinclusiveness of the expansive
definition of a voidable preference in section 547(b). Of course, that
position is forcefully at odds with the primary goal of the preference law
to achieve equality among similarly positioned creditors, and, in turn,
that is the goal that emerged as preeminent in the drafting of the Code
and accounted for the Code's formulation of a voidable preference in
strict liability terms. 4
An alternative explanation, then, is that such transactions advance a
rival policy aim that has to be reconciled with the equality policy that
animates the Code's concept of a voidable preference. That competing
principle is the policy of maximizing debtors' opportunity to steer clear
of bankruptcy entirely by sending the signal to lenders that bankruptcy is
not always the fellow traveler of economic hard times. Putting aside
momentarily the question of which conceptualization is in fact accurate,
we are convinced that it has been the uncertainty and disagreement over
this fundamental question of purpose that has largely accounted for the
serpentine path that the ordinary course of business defense has followed
since 1978. Thus, we wish to leave no measure of doubt that, in our
judgment, the lack of improper ulterior motive in inducing or accepting
payment from a debtor is no longer a sufficient basis for allowing one
creditor to achieve a better result than its similarly placed counterparts.
On the other hand, even though the ordinary course exception impinges
on equality policy to some extent,55 we think it can be defended, as
originally conceived, when applied to short-term, and particularly
routine, credit obligations extended to the debtor after the debtor's slide
into bankruptcy has begun.56

53. See supra note 22.
54. See supratext accompanying notes 23-26.
55. Unlike other preference exceptions, which are based on the infusion of new value and thus do
not involve any diminution of the estate, the ordinary course of business exception does result in a
smaller pool of assets available to satisfy the claims of other general creditors. See Tabb, supra note
3, at 1017-18 (exposing fallacy in argument that exception is simply codification of judiciallycreated "current expense" rule that had been invoked frequently under Bankruptcy Act).
56. See Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warren, Bankruptcy 441-42 (4th ed. 1995) (suggesting

that policy of equality for all creditors must be balanced against cost imposed upon and interference
with ordinary commercial transactions). Of course, this rationale for protecting employees and other
suppliers of short-term unsecured credit offers little support for the extension of the exception to
cover installment payments made on long-term debt.

Washington Law Review
C.

Vol. 72:5, 1997

Compatibilityof the Ordinary CourseException with the
PreferenceLaw

Some commentators contend that to the extent the "purpose" of
section 547(c)(2) is to encourage creditors to do business with troubled
debtors, it is contrary to the "entire concept of preference. 57 In 1985, for
example, no less keen an observer of the bankruptcy law than Professor
Vem Countryman argued with some force that the only apparent
justification for the exception is to allow a debtor to "selectively meet
debts currently coming due in order to continue functioning outside of
bankruptcy," but that this purpose runs against the main flow of the
Code's preference scheme. As stated earlier, preferences are avoidable
because avoidance implements the goal of treating similarly positioned
creditors with substantial equality; if the preferred creditor is not
permitted to get more than the other creditors, then no one creditor is
favored at the expense of the others. Under Countryman's logic, if a
debtor is allowed to select which creditors it pays in the ordinary course
of business, then the debtor is favoring one creditor over others and
preference policy demands that the transfer be avoided without
exception.
Although the logic is sound as far as it goes, we think that the flaw in
this analysis is that every ordinary course payment-whether on the eve
of bankruptcy or not-is in a sense favoring one creditor over another.5 9
Debtors who momentarily cannot meet all of their debts inevitably select
which creditors need regular payment in order for the debtor to stay in
business. It could even be argued that paying a creditor within normal
business terms should never be considered an avoidable transaction since
such payments advance the objective of staving off bankruptcy at all
costs.6" Professor Countryman argues, however, the exception should be
57. Countryman, supra note 3, at 775-76 (declaring exception as "completely at war" with
concept of preference); accord David A. Ontko, Note, Ordinary Business Terms Must Not Be
Ignored: The Forgotten but Critical Role of § 547(c)(2)(C) in the Ordinary Course of Business
Exception to the PreferenceRules, 6 Bankr. Dev. J. 429,438 (1989).

58. Countryman, supranote 3, at 775. A few years later, Professor Charles Tabb also made a case
for repeal of the ordinary course of business defense in its entirety based on its tendency to
undermine the equality-based aims of the preference law which he believes, as do we, predominate
over deterrence policy. See Tabb, supra note 3, at 1029-35.
59. It also ignores the diminution rationale for the current expense rule from which the ordinary
course of business defense derived. See supra note 41.
60. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Security Interests in Bankruptcy: An Overview ofSection 547 ofthe

Code, 17 Hous. L. Rev. 289, 302 (1980) (arguing on policy grounds that exception should support
exemption for any "normal" transaction). The problem with this argument is that it focuses on the
wrong policy, namely, lack of moral culpability, as the primary justification for the exception, rather

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
repealed because it is contrary to the general preference rule.6 Of course,
the preference law only comes into play if an actual bankruptcy ensues.
Therefore, neither argument is entirely correct. They both fail to take
cognizance of the need to balance and accommodate policies that
occasionally pull in opposite directions.
At this juncture, it becomes important to remember what in general
the preference exceptions represent: those transactions that are deemed to
be outside the realm of what is recoverable under the preference law.62
Many courts and commentators have fallen into the syllogistic trap of
requiring the exception to follow the rule.63 In some instances exception
and rule advance a common purpose,' but this result is not always
logically possible. The fact that section 547(c)(2) does not fit perfectly
within the preference scheme is irrelevant so long as the terms of the
exception are narrowly tailored to fit its intended purpose and the scope
of the exception is contained accordingly. Nevertheless, as a result of this
faulty logic, no less perhaps than as a byproduct of the imprudent
expansion of the reach of section 547(c)(2), to which the logic is a
reaction, this unruly provision of preference law continues to be applied
in a manner that undermines the exception's most legitimate purpose,

than staving off bankruptcy. In essence, it is the extension of credit to a floundering debtor, not the
payment on the debt, that is the desirable act. Protecting the payment is simply the way in which to
induce the act. A payment made with respect to a long-term extension of credit is unlikely to
implicate this policy. Therefore, it provides an insufficient basis to warrant deviation from the basic
norm of creditor equality.
61. Countryman, supranote 3, at 776.
62. The word "exception" has been defined as "a case to which a rule does not apply," Webster's
Ninth New CollegiateDictionary 432 (1984), and a "person, thing, or case specified as distinct or
not included," Black's Law Dictionary559 (6th ed. 1990).
63. See, e.g., Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund (In re
Jones Truck Lines, Inc.), 196 B.R. 483 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1995) ("The exception of section
547(c)(2) must be considered in the context of the principal goal of the preference section .... ").
64. For example, the defenses in § 547(c)(1) and (4) for contemporaneous exchanges and
subsequent advances, respectively, are both consistent with the view that what makes a preference a
preference is a post-insolvency reduction in the net distributable estate that redounds to the benefit of
a single general creditor. See, e.g., Reigle v. Mahajan (In re Kumar Bavishi & Assocs.), 906 F.2d
942, 950 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that in determining whether "new value" requirement has been
satisfied, focus should be on whether there was augmentation of or material benefit to estate);
Anderson-Smith Assocs. v. Xyplex, Inc. (In re Anderson-Smith & Assocs.), 188 B.R. 679, 688
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (observing that purpose of new value exception to preference avoidance is
to protect transactions that do not result in diminution of estate). Of course, the subsequent advance
rule also has as an equally important part of its rationale the notion of encouraging creditors to
continue to do business with troubled debtors. See infra note 251.
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that of allowing debtors to continue doing business as usual in order
(with a little good fortune) to stay out of bankruptcy altogether.65
III. THE 1984 AMENDMENTS AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
EXPANDING THE REACH OF THE ORDINARY COURSE OF
BUSINESS DEFENSE
In the early stages of section 547(c)(2)'s application (prior to 1984),

litigation over the ordinary course requirement focused primarily on
timing.66 Because eligibility for protection under the ordinary course of
business defense as originally enacted required proof by the transfereecreditor that the preferential transfer did not occur longer than forty-five
days67 after the debt was incurred,68 early cases struggled with trying to
pinpoint the particular moments in time when the operative events took
place so that the relevant measurement could be made. 9 In addition, this
limitation proved problematic for corporate issuers of commercial paper,
certain trade creditors, and consumer lenders, because their transactions
did not always fit within this time period. 0 For those reasons alone, and

65. See, e.g., Advo-System, Inc. v. Maxway Corp., 37 F.3d 1044, 1050 (4th Cir. 1994); Redmond
v. Ellis Co. Abstract & Title Co. (In re Liberty Livestock Co.), 198 B.R. 365, 373 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1996) ("The purpose of the ordinary course of business defense is to encourage creditors to continue
to do business with financially strapped debtors."); see also Terry M. Anderson. In re Iowa Premium
Service Co.: When is a Debt Incurred Under Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 17
Creighton L. Rev. 1075, 1093-94 (1984) (suggesting that one of original purposes for § 547(c)(2)
was to encourage extensions of short-term credit to marginal debtors and, thus, help keep struggling
debtors out of bankruptcy whenever possible). But see Sacred Heart Hosp. v. E.B. O'Reilly
Servicing Corp. (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 200 B.R. 114, 117 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996)
(concluding that this particular public policy is not recognized in § 547(c)(2)).
66. See DeSimone, supranote 3, at 108.
67. Apparently, Congress chose a 45-day period because the legislators believed that this was the
length of the normal trade credit billing cycle. See Richard B. Levin, An Introductionto the Trustee's
Avoiding Powers, 53 Am. Bank. L.J 173, 186 (1986); see also Broome, supra note 3, at 97-99
(reviewing relevant legislative history, which demonstrates that concern of exception, at least
originally, was with short-term transactions of routine nature).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1978) (amended 1984).
69. See Chaim J. Fortang & Lawrence P. King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Some Wrong Policy
Decisions, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1148, 1167 (1981) (criticizing 45-day requirement as suffering from
vagueness); see also Broome, supranote 3, at 102 nn.1 12-14; infra note 260.
70. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 157-58 nn.10-12 (1991); see also 130 Cong. Rec.
20013, 20091 (1984) (recording discussion between Sens. Dole and DeConcini concerning reasons
for eliminating 45-day requirement). For an extensive discussion of the legislative history leading up
to the amendment of § 547(c)(2) in 1984, see Broome, supra note 3, at 101-04, and Countryman,
supra note 3, at 770-72.

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
not apparently for the purpose of protecting payments on long-term
debt,7 Congress eliminated the forty-five day requirement.72
Despite the explicit reasons for the elimination of section 547(c)(2)'s
time requirement, courts confronted a new controversy after the
amendment's enactment-whether payments on long-term debts could
be excepted from the reach of the trustee's avoidance power under
section 547(b).73 As already observed, roughly seven years later, the U.S.
Supreme Court settled this issue in Union Bank v. Wolas. 4 In Wolas, the
debtor made two interest payments and paid a loan commitment fee to
the creditor who had loaned the debtor seven million dollars six months
before bankruptcy.75 If the purpose for the exception is framed in terms
of encouraging creditors to continue to do business with a financially
beleaguered debtor by offering to shield payments made, as an example,
on recurring monthly accruals such as rent and routine trade debt, then
there is good reason to distinguish between that type of creditor"6 and a
supplier as in Wolas, of conventional kinds of long-term financing to be
repaid on an installment basis. Nonetheless, applying the "plain
meaning""' approach to statutory construction that has come to

71. See Broome, supra note 3, at 100-01 (noting that virtually all complaints about 45-day
requirement came from trade creditors, commercial paper issuers, and consumer lenders).
72. See supra note 4. At the same time, Congress adopted § 547(c)(7) (now (c)(8)) to provide a
defense for small transfers by a consumer debtor. That provision was a direct response to the
complaints voiced by consumer credit industry players that the 45-day rule in § 547(c)(2) operated to
deprive them of protection for regular installment payments received on long-term consumer loans.
See infra note 269. Thus, the consumer creditors ended up getting both the elimination of the 45-day
rule and their own exception. See generally Countryman, supra note 3, at 813-16 (expressing some
antipathy toward exception).
73. The Ninth Circuit, for example, held that it did not foster congressional policy to allow longterm creditors to make use of the exception, whereas both the Sixth and the Tenth Circuits ruled that,
after the 1984 amendment, long-term debt was as amenable to the exception as trade debt. Gosch v.
Bums (In re Finn), 909 F.2d 903, 907 (6th Cir. 1990); CHG Int'l, Inc. v. Barclays Bank (In re CHG
Int'l, Inc.), 897 F.2d 1479, 1482 (9th Cir. 1990); Fidelity Say. & Inv. Co. v. New Hope Baptist, 880
F.2d 1172, 1177 (10th Cir. 1989).
74. 502 U.S. 151 (1991).
75. See id. at 152-53.
76. See, e.g., Waldschmidt v. Ranier (In re Fulghum Constr. Corp.), 872 F.2d 739, 744 n.6 (6th
Cir. 1989); Redmand v. Ellis County Abstract & Title Co. (In re Liberty Livestock Co.), 198 B.R.
365, 373 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996); supranote 65.
77. Wolas, 502 U.S. at 151. For a general discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's approach in
recent years to deciding bankruptcy cases, see Carlos J. Cuevas, The Rehnquist Court, Strict
Statutory Construction and the Bankruptcy Code, 42 Clev. St. L. Rev. 435 (1994); Thomas G.
Kelch, An Apologyfor Plain-MeaningInterpretationof the Bankruptcy Code, 10 Bankr. Dev. .L
289
(1994); Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study ofthe Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's
Bankruptcy Cases, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 535 (1993); Charles J. Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of
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characterize the U.S. Supreme Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence, the
Court reasoned that the "text of 547(c)(2) as enacted reflects -the
deliberate choice of Congress," despite the unforeseen consequences of
including long-term debt within the exception." Thus, the Court
permitted the lender to retain the payments under section 547(c)(2).79
As a result of Wolas, trustees have less opportunity to avoid
preferential transfers than when ordinary course transactions were
limited to payments on trade and other short-term debt to fund
continuing operations. Consequently, the debtors' distributable estates in
many cases will be smaller, and unsecured creditors as a class will be
treated with less equality, than had theretofore been the case. On the
other hand, the individual creditors that took their chances by providing
money, goods, or services to a debtor in the regular course of business
will be protected should they receive repayment during the statutory
preference period. In theory, this result should encourage creditors to
continue conducting business as usual with their regular customers in
spite of an unexpected downturn in the economic well-being of a debtor
firm. The rub, of course, is that it is highly unlikely that a creditor that
first makes the decision to extend credit or loan money perhaps years
prior to the challenged payment has rendered emergency aid to a highrisk debtor. That situation stands in stark contrast to the case of a creditor
that extends current value immediately prior to, if not actually after, the
time the debtor became insolvent. In both situations, protecting the
payments made may involve leaving normal financial relations
undisturbed, but it is in the nature of the preference law to disturb normal
financial relations, some more than others. Accordingly, this justification
for the exception to preference recovery is only sufficient in the latter
case where the creditor has supplied the kind of routine, short-term credit
that is necessary for the continuation of the debtor's daily operations."
Moreover, as discussed more fully in the materials to follow,8 to the
extent that the 1984 amendment of section 547(c)(2) and Wolas might
have been defended as providing an added incentive for creditors to
continue to transact business with a debtor experiencing financial woes,
Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudenceof the Rehnquist Court, 42
Syracuse L. Rev. 823 (1991).
78. Wolas, 502 U.S. at 160.
79. See id. at 162.
80. See Broome, supra note 3, at 118-19 (similarly suggesting that goal of encouraging creditors
to deal with financially struggling debtor is sensible way to interpret "ordinary course" for purposes
of applying exception in § 547(c)(2)).
81. See infra notes 234-241 and accompanying text.

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
the contemporaneous trend toward an objective interpretation of
subsection C has acted as a discouraging counterweight more than
offsetting any such benefit."2
After Wolas, or in anticipation of the interpretation adopted by the
Court in that case, many commentators urged amendment of the
exception." One scholar claimed that by including long-term debt in the
ordinary course exception, the goal of preference law shifted from that of
"preserving equality of distribution of the debtor's assets among its
creditors to that of avoiding preferential transfers received by creditors
under unusual circumstances."" A logical response to that argument
might be that if the goal of the ordinary course of business exception is
to leave undisturbed normal financial relations, then this so-called "shift
in preference law" has arguably aligned the exception's use with its
intended purpose by permitting the debtor to decide which creditors are
most vital to its survival. In other words, Wolas has not affected
preference rules, but affected merely an exception to the rule.85 The only
problem with that rejoinder is that it is hollow unless one also presumes
that the preferred creditor was prepared to, or did in fact, offer a valuable
quid pro quo for the favored treatment, and there is no basis for
indulging a presumption of that sort in the vast bulk of cases.
Conversely, if the purpose of the exception is framed in terms of
encouraging creditors to continue to do business with a financially
beleaguered debtor by offering to shield payments made, as an example,
on recurring monthly accruals such as rent and routine trade debt, then
there is good reason to distinguish between that type of creditor, who the
exception was originally intended to protect,86 and the suppliers of
82. See infra text accompanying notes 252-253.
83. See generally Ponoroff,supra note 3, at 1494-95.
84. Broome, supranote 3, at 81.
85. In 1985, Professor Countryman suggested that the ordinary course exception is justified if it
takes into account payments on both long-term and short-term obligations. Countryman illustrates: A
banker's long-term note and a retailer's long overdue accounts may present the same obstacle to
keeping the debtor out of bankruptcy. See Countryman, supra note 3, at 775-76. His logic suggests
that as long as both of these kinds of payments are excepted from the preference section, then the
goal of the exception-preserving "normal financial relations" is met. See id. Yet, few courts or
commentators see the effect of Wolas this way. In additon, this analysis ignores the question of why
it is important to preseve "normal financial relations." See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying
text. Ultimately, we recognize that payments on some long-term debt might properly be shielded
under an ordinary course exception, but we recommend different, stricter standards in those cases.
See infra notes 256-273 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Miller v. Kibler (In re Winters), 182 B.R. 26, 29 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1995) ("It is clear
that § 547(c)(2) applies if the debtor and the transferee have an ongoing, 'recurring' business
relationship."); Aguillard v. Bank of Lafayette (In re Bourgeois), 58 B.R. 657, 659 (Bankr. W.D. La.
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conventional kinds of long-term financing repaid on an installment basis.
Wolas, however, has foreclosed drawing any such distinction, and in fact,
hopelessly blurred the two together.
Although the focus in section 547(c)(2) cases changed dramatically
after Wolas, that decision did not end the controversy over the ordinary
course of business exception. Rather, perhaps in reaction to the decision,
or perhaps just in futility,87 beginning in 1992, courts turned to a new
interpretation of section 547(c)(2) by zeroing in on the theretofore
neglected provision in subsection C. This new interpretation has shifted
the ordinary course of business defense as applied even further away
from the goal of maximizing the prospects of avoiding bankruptcy
entirely to a new and perverse sort of equality policy, one that advocates
leaving all creditors that can demonstrate, by implication, a lack of moral
blameworthiness free from the trustee's preference power. In this
connection, the "ordinary" nature of the payment supplies the inferential
proof of lack of intent to gain an advantage over other creditors. As
mentioned earlier,88 however, lack of preferential intent is no longer
relevant to preference analysis, nor, arguably was it ever a particularly
sensible rationale since it is only natural for a creditor that becomes
aware of a debtor's financial peril to push for payment. Thus, the new
interpretation, although welcome because it offers a limitation to
counterbalance the dangerously expanded reach of the exception after
Wolas, has completely misaligned the use and purpose of the exception
in a manner that has seriously undermined the integrity of the Code's
preference law scheme. It is the story of that new interpretation that we
turn to next.
IV. ORDINARY COURSE LITIGATION AFTER WOLAS: USING
THE DEFENSE TO ALTER THE GOAL OF PREFERENCE
LAW
Ever since Congress removed the time limitation from section
547(c)(2) and the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed the far-reaching
implications of that congressional action, courts have focused on the

1986) (noting that ordinary course exception is intended to except payments for short-term
obligations to cash creditors whose debts come due on monthly basis); see also Countryman, supra
note 3, at 769 (noting that clearly Congress intended to limit exception to payment of current
expenses).
87. See infra text accompanying note 241.
88. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
final prong of the ordinary course of business exception.89 Specifically,
debate has centered around the meaning of the phrase "ordinary business
terms" in subsection C. Does that language require a separate, objective
showing of ordinary course outside of the historical course of dealing
between the parties, or is a subjective showing of the parties' prior
practices acceptable?
The meaning of "ordinary business terms" is anything but plain. It is
not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and the legislative history provides
little additional insight.9" As the Third Circuit recognized: "Neither a
perfunctory survey of the bare language of section 547(c)(2), nor a
careful, resolute stare, would lead the average reader to an appreciable
understanding of what subsection (C) adds to subsections (A) and (B)."
Consequently, courts are left with the difficult task of making subsection
C fit within the broader framework and purpose of the ordinary course
exception. Lamentably, their performance in this capacity has left
something to be desired.
A.

The OriginalInterpretation-ASubjective Look at OrdinaryTerms
Between Debtorand Creditor

1.

The Purposes Underlying the Subjective Approach

Before 1991, the majority of the circuit courts of appeals required only
a showing that the transaction at issue was similar to the past practices
between the debtor and a specific creditor in order to satisfy subsection
C's ordinary business terms.92 The standard thus coincided with the
89. DeSimone, supra note 3, at 108. Before the 1984 Amendments, the 45-day limitation tended
to be the most frequently litigated element of the ordinary course of business defense. Id. at 108.
After that element of the defense was removed, the emphasis shifted from timing considerations to
the proper definition of "ordinariness." See David A. Ontko, Note, Ordinary Business Terms Must
Not Be Ignored: The Forgotten But Critical Role of § 547(c)(2)(C) in the Ordinary Course of
Business Exception to the Preference Rules, 6 Bank. Dev. J. 429, 436 (1989); see also Nutovic,
supra note 23, at 177 n.11 ("It can be argued that the elimination of the 45-day rule will not decrease
the volume of litigation over § 547(c)(2) but will merely shift the litigation focus to the remaining
requirements of that subsection.").
90. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
91. Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical Prods, Inc.), 18
F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 1994).
92. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits originally (pre-Wolas) required only a subjective showing of ordinariness. See, e.g., Lovett
v. St. Johnsbury Trucking, 931 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that subsection may
require proof of industry standards but not relying on those standards); Morrison v. Champion Credit
Corp. (In re Barefoot), 952 F.2d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 1991); In re J.P. Fyfe, Inc. v. Bradco Supply
Corp., 891 F.2d 66, 71 (3d Cir. 1989); Waldschmidt v. Ranier (In re Fulghum Constr. Corp.), 872
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standard of "ordinary course of business" under subsection B so that, as a
practical matter, it added very little additional burden to the transfereecreditor's case. There were numerous reasons for this approach, derived
from, among other sources, statutory interpretation, legislative history,
and judicial creativity. In Ewald Bros. v. Kraft, Inc. (In re Ewald Bros),93
for example, the bankruptcy court declared the subjective approach to be

F.2d 739, 743 (6th Cir. 1989); Courtney v. Octopi, Inc. (In re Colonial Discount Corp.), 807 F.2d
594, 600 (7th Cir. 1986); Marathon Oil Co. v. Flatau (In re Craig Oil Co.), 785 F.2d 1563, 1565
(llth Cir. 1986).
Lower courts in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits required an objective test prior to Wolas. See, e.g.,
Estate of SPW Corp. v. A.P.V. Equip., Inc. (In re SPW Corp.), 96 B.R. 683, 689 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1989) (5th Circuit); In re Magic Circle Energy Corp., 64 B.R. 269, 272 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986)
(10th Circuit); see also Iannacone v. Klement Sausage Co. (In re Hancock-Nelson Mercantile Co.),
122 B.R. 1006 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991); Richardson v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. (In re Richardson),
94 B.R. 56 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit was a little
more equivocal on the issue, although generally supportive of an objective standard. See Bell Flavors
& Fragrances, Inc. v. Andrew (In re Loretto Winery, Ltd.), 107 B.R. 707, 709 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989)
(suggesting that § 547(c)(2)(C) embodies purely objective standard); Gold Coast Seed Co. v.
Beachner Seed Co. (In re Gold Coast Seed Co.), 24 B.R. 595, 597 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (applying
subjective standard).
The Second Circuit did not address the meaning of "ordinary business terms" prior to Wolas.
However, after Wolas several lower courts in the Second Circuit have applied the objective standard.
See, e.g., McCord v. Venus Foods, Inc. (In re Lan Yik Foods Corp.), 185 B.R. 103, 110 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1995); Wallach v. Vulcan Steam Forging Co. (In re D.J. Management Group, Inc.), 164
B.R. 831, 835 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994); Sapir v. Green Forest Lumber Ltd. (In re Ajayem Lumber
Corp.), 145 B.R. 813, 818 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). Eventually, the Second Circuit spoke to the issue
and concluded that under § 547(c)(2)(C) the conduct of the debtor and creditor must be considered
objectively in light of industry practice. Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.), 78
F.3d 30, 40 (2d Cir. 1996). In Roblin, the trustee challenged a $53,320.78 payment on an open
account debt made by the debtor within 90 days of the filing of the debtor's chapter I1 petition. The
bankruptcy court found that the transfer was preferential and that the payment was not protected
under § 547(c)(2) because it was not made in accordance with the terms of the debtor's account with
the creditor. See Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.), 127 B.R. 722, 725 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1991), af'd, 78 F.3d 30 (2d. Cir. 1996). The Second Circuit rejected the rule that a
payment made pursuant to a debt restructuring could never be deemed made according to ordinary
business terms, but nevertheless upheld the ruling based on the district court's finding that Ford had
failed to offer any evidence whatsoever of the ordinary practices of similarly situated firms. Roblin,
78 F.3d at 41.
Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has been cited for using the objective
standard pre-Wolas, see infra note 129 and accompanying text, the court of appeals for that circuit
has never explicitly so held. See, e.g., WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d
996, 1011 (st Cir. 1988). Post-Wolas, lower courts within the First Circuit apply the objective
standard. See, e.g., Gray v. Huntsman Chem. Corp. (In re Dooley Plastics Co.), 185 B.R. 389, 392
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1995); Miller v. Perini Corp. (In re A.J. Lane & Co.), 164 B.R. 409,416 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1994).
93. 45 B.R. 52 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
a "common sense interpretation of the statute."'94 The court recognized
that while many commentators had debated the proper standard, courts
were consistently defining the term "ordinary" as "that which is ordinary
as between the respective parties."'95 Only in the absence of a specific
past history with the particular creditor that received the preference
would the courts resolve the issue with reference to the creditor's prior
transactions with other debtors.96
Some courts relied on legislative history to justify this interpretation
of the exception.9 7 For example, in Marathon Oil Co. v. Flatau (In re
Craig Oil Co.),98 the Eleventh Circuit looked to Congress's statement
that the purpose of the exception is to "leave undisturbed normal
financial relations."99 As a result, the court stated:
It seems clear from this statement that § 547(c)(2) should protect
those payments which do not result from "unusual" debt collection
or payment practices. To the extent an otherwise "normal" payment
occurs in response to such practices, it is without the scope of
§ 547(c)(2). Thus, whenever the bankruptcy court receives
evidence of unusual collection efforts, it must consider whether the
debtor's payment was in fact a response to those efforts.100
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit opined that the unordinary transactions
about which Congress was concerned were those that were related to prebankruptcy planning, that is, those transactions that were obviously not
commercially normal.' Clearly, these sentiments reflected a continued
preoccupation with pre-Code concepts of state of mind and moral
innocence as critical ingredients of a preferential transfer. As

94. Id. at 57 ("I am unwilling to deviate from such a common sense interpretation of the statute.
Consequently, it will be necessary to view each transfer in the context of the parties' past course of
dealing.").
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Howison v. Adkin Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. (In re Wvebsco, Ihc.), 92 B.R. 1,
3 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988); Campbell v. Cannington (In re Economy Milling Co.), 37 B.R. 914, 922
(D.S.C.1983).
97. See, e.g., Morrison v. Champion Credit Corp. (In re Barefoot), 952 F.2d 795, 801 (4th Cir.
1991).
98. 785 F.2d 1563 (1Ith Cir. 1986).
99. See 1978 House Report, supra note 17, at 373-74; see also supra note 46 and accompanying
text.
100. Craig Oil, 785 F.2d at 1566. The Eleventh Circuit's view rested on its belief that the
exception is directed toward trade credit. See id. at 1567.
101. See Courtney v. Octopi, Inc. (In re Colonial Discount Corp.), 807 F.2d 594, 600 (7th Cir.
1986).
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however, the drafters of the Code deliberately eliminated

any mens rea test from the definition of a voidable preference, thereby
rendering suspect the credibility of explanations predicated on those
concepts. In marked contrast to the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits, the
Sixth Circuit adopted the subjective interpretation of "ordinary course"
and "ordinary business terms" on the ground that it was consonant with
the exception's goal of allowing creditors to deal with troubled debtors in
order to help them forestall bankruptcy or avoid filing altogether.0 3 In
the final analysis, then, because no real consensus on the purposive
object of the ordinary course of business defense ever emerged, the threat
always existed for application of the exception on an inconsistent, if not
ad hoc, basis. The lack of a shared understanding also left the door open
to inventive reinterpretation, a threat that subsequently proved to be a
much more serious one.
2.

The PracticalEffect of the Subjective Approach

As noted, the subjective approach concerned itself with the way in
which a transferee-creditor dealt with one particular debtor. Courts
required only a showing that the challenged transaction conformed with
the past relationship between the debtor and the creditor in order to
satisfy section 547(c)(2)(C).' 4 To aid in this inquiry, one bankruptcy
court'0 5 suggested that courts "consider factors such as the prior course of
dealing between the parties, the amount of the payment, the timing of the
payment, and the circumstances surrounding the payment.' 10 6 These

102. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text; see also Weisberg, supra note 3, at 116-18
(explaining evolution of preference law in these terms).
103. See Waldschmidt v. Ranier (In re Fulghum Constr. Corp.), 872 F.2d 744, 744 (6th Cir.
1989). The Fulghum court stated: "The primary purpose of that section was to encourage 'short term
credit dealing[s] with troubled debtors in order to forestall bankruptcy."' Id. (quoting In re First
Software Corp., 81 B.R. 211,213 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988)). Further, the court cited O'Neill v. Nestle
Libbys P.R., Inc., 729 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984), for the proposition that the "exception is designed to
encourage creditors to conduct business with a struggling enterprise so that debtors can rehabilitate
themselves." Id at 37.
104. See, e.g., Fulghum Constr., 872 F.2d at 743 ("The focus of this court's inquiry must be
directed to an analysis of the business practices which were unique to the particular parties under
consideration and not to the practices which generally prevailed in the industry of the parties.");
accord Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Solomon (In re Industrial Metal Fabricators), No. 89-1814,
1990 WL 57232, at *3 (6th Cir. May 2, 1990); In re J.P. Fyfe Inc., 891 F.2d 66,71 (3d Cir. 1989).
105. Newton v. Ed's Supply Co. (In re White), 58 B.R. 266 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986).
106. Id. at 269; see also Warren v. Huntington Nat'l Bank (In re Ullman), 80 B.R. 101, 103
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (suggesting that court must consider prior dealings of parties, amount,
timing, and circumstances surrounding particular payments).

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
factors, when followed among the courts adopting the subjective
approach, allowed even irregular transactions to be excepted if they were
consistent with the parties' course of dealing.'17 The types of transactions
that were held to fall within the exception under the subjective test
included first-time loan payments,' 8 late or irregular payments,01 9 short0
term cash advances," and regular trade payments."'
Today, the Eleventh Circuit remains the only court of appeals that still
applies the subjective test. Although that court has not addressed the
issue since its 1986 Craig Oil decision, several of the district courts in
the Eleventh Circuit still follow Craig Oil, ignoring industry standards
altogether. As one district court made clear: "The analysis of this
exception to the trustee's avoidance powers is based upon the
circumstances of the business transactions between the parties, not the
standardin the industry.... 2
However, the strength of the Eleventh Circuit view is waning. Within
the past two years, bankruptcy courts in Georgia have strayed from the
subjective approach and adopted the objective interpretation of
subsection C, which is now followed by the vast majority of courts in
other circuits."' If or when the Eleventh Circuit falls to the objective

107. See, e.g., Yurika Foods Corp. v. United Parcel Serv. (In re Yurika Foods Corp.), 888 F.2d
42, 45 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding late payments within exception); Fulghum Constr., 872 F.2d at 74345 (finding prompt repayments on advances to cover overdrafts within exception).
108. See, e.g., Gosch v. Bums (In re Finn), 909 F.2d 903, 908 (6th Cir. 1990).
109. See, e.g., Yurika Foods, 888 F.2d at 45; Carson v. Metzger Bus. Forms (In re Decor Noel
Corp.), 65 B.R 707, 709 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1985); White, 58 B.R. at 270; Carmack v. Zell (In re
Mindy's, Inc.), 17 B.R 177, 179-80 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
I10. See, e.g., Fulghum Constr., 872 F.2d at 743-45; Courtney v. Octopi, Inc. (In re Colonial
Discount Corp.), 807 F.2d 594,600 (7th Cir. 1986).
111. See, e.g., Tolz v. Sunspa/Skinflicks (In re Sunup/Sundown, Inc.), 66 B.Rt 1021, 1022-23
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986).
112. Braniff, Inc. v. Sundstrand Data Control (In re Braniff, Inc.), 154 B.R. 773, 780 (M.D. Fla.
1993) (emphasis added); see also Grant v. Suntrust Bank (In re L. Bee Furniture Co.), No. 96-1017BKC-3P7, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1629, at *10-*11 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 1996); Miller v. Florida
Mining & Materials (In re A.W. & Assocs.), 196 B.R. 900 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1996) (applying Craig
Oil);
Graphic Prods. Corp. v. WWF Paper Corp. (In re Graphic Prods. Corp.), 176 B.R 65 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1994) (refusing to apply industry standards test in determination of whether transfer was
made in ordinary course). A more equivocal view is expressed in Grant v. Estate of Beverly S.
Thurman (In re Thurman Constr. Inc.), 189 B.R. 1004, 1011-13 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995), wherein
the court cited Braniff, but stopped short of expressly adopting it. Subsequent decisions have
characterized Thurman as in accord with Braniff. See, e.g., Grant v. Suntrust Bank (In re L. Bee
Furniture Co.), 200 B.R 68,71 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
113. See generally Willson v. MLA, Inc. (In re Ascot Mortgage, Inc.), 153 B.R. 1002 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1993); Scroggins v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. (In re Brown Transp. Truckload, Inc.), 161
B.R. 735 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
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approach, it would join the Courts of Appeals for the Second," 4 Third,"1251
l8
Eighth, 9 Ninth, 2 ° and Tenth Circuits.
Fourth," 6 Sixth," 7 Seventh,
However, this apparent consensus among the circuits is deceiving. There
are subtle but important shadings of interpretational difference between
and among the circuit decisions adopting an objective standard, 22 and
this lack of unanimity is one more reason why section 547(c)(2) is in
need of repair.
B.

The Latest Trend-An Objective Look at Industry Norms

The trend among the courts of appeals to break from the subjective
interpretation of subsection C began in 1992.123 The Sixth Circuit was the
114. Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.), 78 F.3d 30,40 (2d Cir. 1996).
115. See, e.g., Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical Prods.,
Inc.), 18 F.3d 217, 225-26 (3d Cir. 1994).
116. See, e.g., Advo-System, Inc. v. Maxway Corp., 37 F.3d 1044, 1050 (4th Cir. 1994).
117. See, e.g., Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp. (In re Fred Hawes Org. Inc.), 957 F.2d 239, 244 (6th
Cir. 1992). The Sixth Circuit elaborated on its original holding in FredHawes in Luper v. Columbia
Gas of Ohio, Inc. (In re Carled, Inc.), 91 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 1996).
118. See, e.g., In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1993); see also In re
Midway Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 1995) (expanding upon Tolona Pizza).
119. See, e.g., Jones v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re U.S.A. Inns), 9 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir.
1993).
120. See, e.g., Mordy v. Chemcarb, Inc. (In re Food Catering & Hous., Inc.), 971 F.2d 396, 398
(9th Cir. 1992).
121. See, e.g., Clark v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Meridith Hoffinan Partners), 12 F.3d
1549, 1553 (10th Cir. 1993). As of this writing, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First and Fifth
Circuits have not addressed the exception, although bankruptcy courts within each circuit have
adopted the objective approach. See, e.g., Gray v. Huntsman Chem. Corp. (l-re Dooley Plastics
Co.), 185 B.R. 389 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (First Circuit); Miller v. Perini Corp. (In re A.J. Lane &
Co.), 164 B.R. 409, 416 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (First Circuit); Krafsur v. Scurlock Permian Corp.
(In re El Paso Refinery, L.P.), 178 B.R. 426 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) (Fifth Circuit); Estate of SPW
Corp. v. A.P.V. Equip., Inc. (In re SPW Corp.), 96 B.R. 683, 689 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989) (Fifth
Circuit).
122. For a detailed review of some of the differences from circuit to circuit, see Braunstein v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp. (In re Broderick Co.), No. 92-11974-CJK, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 105 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1996).
123. See El PasoRefinery, 178 B.R. at 440 (suggesting that "very little controversy remains"
insofar as proper interpretation accorded to subsection C). It is perhaps more proper to express the
standard under § 547(c)(2) as now containing both an objective and a subjective prong, since
subsections A and B are still determined with reference to the practice of the particular parties. See
generally WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996, 1011 (1st Cir. 1988)
(characterizing need to prove consistency with other business transactions between debtor and
transferee as "cornerstone" of § 547(c)(2)(B)). See also McCord v. Venus Foods, Inc. (In re Lan Yik
Foods Corp.), 185 B.R. 103 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that subjective inquiry is called for
under subsections A and B).

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
first of the originally subjective approach courts to adopt the objective
standard. 24 In Logan v. Basic Distribution Corp. (In re Fred Hawes
Organization, Inc.), z the Sixth Circuit specifically rejected the
subjective approach, claiming that each subsection of the statute must be
satisfied in order for the creditor to retain a preferential payment. 2 6 In
support of its departure from earlier authority and the then-majority rule,
the court recognized that section 547(c)(2) is written in the conjunctive,
indicating clear congressional intent that separate showings are

required. 127
In establishing the objective requirement of subsection C, the court
did not, as it had earlier,' 28 rely on congressional intent. Instead, the court
erroneously cited the First Circuit's language in WJM, Inc. v.
Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare'29 as authority for the
proposition that subsection C, by its terms, requires proof of industry
standards. 3 ' Despite having already found that the payments in question
did not satisfy the exception because they did not meet subsection B,' 3
the FredHawes court felt obliged to address the proper interpretation of
124. See Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp. (In re Fred Hawes Org., Inc.), 957 F.2d 239, 243-44 (6th
Cir. 1992) ("While this court has not expressly established the requirement that fulfillment of each
subsection is necessary in order to receive the benefit of the exception, it does so now."). In 1986, a
bankruptcy court in the Sixth Circuit decided Production Steel, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am. (In re
Production Steel, Inc.), 54 B.R. 417 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985). In that case, the court required proof
of objective standards of the industry. However, the bankruptcy court did not cite to any Sixth
Circuit precedent for this interpretation. Id. at 423-24. Six years later, the Sixth Circuit officially
adopted the objective interpretation in Logan. For further discussion about these developments in the
Sixth Circuit, see infra notes 164-169 and accompanying text.
125. 957 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1992).
126. See id. at 243-244. District courts within the Sixth Circuit have at times considered the
objective prong along with the subjective test. See, e.g., Remes v. ASC Meat Imports, Ltd. (In re
Morren Meat & Poultry Co.), 92 B.R. 737, 741 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (finding payment within
exception after looking at industry terms). However, the Sixth Circuit has not previously mandated
such consideration. See FredHaves, 957 F.2d at 243.
127. FredHawes,957 F.2d at 244.
128. See supranote 103.
129. 840 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1988).
130. See FredHawes, 957 F.2d at 244. The Sixth Circuit cited WJM despite the fact that the WJM
opinion does not refer to "industry standards." In fact, the decision dealt only with subsection B
which focuses on payments "made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee." See WJM, 840 F.2d at 1011. The only mention of subsection C in WJMis
for the proposition that it is an element that must be proven separately. See id. In this connection,
however, the WJM court did not establish how this separate proof of ordinary business terms is
achieved, that is, by showing industry standards or by establishing conformity with terms between
the individual creditor and debtor. See id.Thus, the Sixth Circuit's reliance on WJM for the
proposition that subsection C requires proof of industry standards is clearly misplaced.
131. FredHawes,957 F.2d at 245.
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the "ordinary business terms" language in subsection C.32 The court
concluded that a creditor cannot rest on evidence of the standards
between itself and its other debtors. Rather, "the particular transaction in
question [must] comport[] with the standard conduct of business within
the industry."'3 3 The creditor in this case, Basic, attempted to establish
industry standards by introducing evidence of what was ordinary
between Basic and its approximately 1500 electrical subcontractors,
rather than the industry as a whole.134 Basic argued that such evidence
was more probative of ordinary business terms than industry-wide
practices because of differences in the "credit policies adopted by various
suppliers in the industry."' 3 5 The court rejected this contention.'36 Instead,
the court found that even if subsection B had been satisfied, the creditor
could not have prevailed because of the lack of proof that its payment
practices coincided with prevailing payment practices in its industry.'37
1.

The Purposes Underlying the Objective Approach

Although the Sixth Circuit offered no unique justification for its
abrupt shift to an objective interpretation of the ordinary business terms
requirement, a year later in In re Tolona Pizza Products Corp., Judge
Posner of the Seventh Circuit provided what has become the generally
accepted rationale for the industry standards, objective approach to
section 547(c)(2)(C). Specifically, Judge Posner found two functions for
the newly minted interpretation of "ordinary business terms" in
subsection C. First, proof of industry standards satisfies an evidentiary
standard.'3 9 Judge Posner explained: "If the debtor and creditor dealt on
terms that the creditor testifies were normal for them but that are wholly
132. Id.
133. Id. at 246. Later, in Luper v. Columbia Gas, Inc. (In re Carled, Inc.), 91 F.3d 811 (6th Cir.
1996), the Sixth Circuit softened its stance somewhat under circumstances where the defendantcreditor introduced evidence to show that it was not possible to obtain information concerning
competitors' billing practices. Id. at 818.
134. FredHawes, 957 F.2d at 245.
135. Id.at 246.
136. Id.
137. Id. The standard under both subsections A and B of § 547(c)(2) continues to be governed by
a subjective test. See, e.g., Redmond v. Ellis County Abstract & Title Co. (In re Liberty Livestock
Co.), 198 B.R. 365, 373 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996); Styler v. Landmark Petroleum, Inc. (In re Peterson
Distrib., Inc.), 197 B.R 919, 922 (D. Utah 1996); Precision Walls, Inc. v. Crompton, 196 B.R. 299,
309 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
138. 3 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1993).
139. Id.at 1032.
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unknown to the industry, this casts some doubt on his (self-serving)
testimony.' ' 40 Second, proof of industry standards quells the fear of some
creditors that another creditor worked out a "special deal" with the
debtor before the preference period to give that creditor special treatment
in the event of a bankruptcy filing. 4 ' Curiously, both aspects of this
explanation focus on "preferential intent" as the determinative factor, in
spite of the deliberate decision in the drafting of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act to denude preference law of its subjective components.
Another frequently offered explanation for requiring that the transfer
be "ordinary" in an objective (industry norms), as well as a subjective,
sense is that the "plain meaning" of the provision supports the
requirement of industry standards. 4 ' The argument goes that while
subsections A and B specifically refer to the ordinary course of business
between the debtor and creditor, subsection C does not mention the
parties. Therefore, proof of industry standards is required by inference
since some standard is obviously needed.'43 Clearly, the omission of any
reference to the parties' conduct means something. That it necessarily
implies incorporation of industry standards, however, is a different kettle
of fish entirely.
2.

The PracticalEffect of the Objective Approach

It is our contention that through adoption of an objective interpretation
of subsection C requiring observance of industry terms and practices, the
courts have weakened the goals of preference law and undermined the
integrity of the ordinary course exception. Somewhat ironically, it might
appear at first blush that requiring conformity with industry standards
actually places all creditors or potential creditors on a more equal footing
in at least two ways: (1) in the pre-bankraptcy stage the creditors are
equal because they must adhere to the same standards; and (2) in
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Advo-System, Inc. v. Maxway Corp., 37 F.3d 1044, 1048 (4th Cir. 1994)
("Because subsections B and C are written in the conjunctive, the use of subsection B's subjective
approach under subsection C would render subsection C superfluous."); see also Richardson v.
Philadelphia Hous. Auth. (In re Richardson), 94 B.R. 56, 59-60 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988)
(distinguishing nature of inquiry under subsections B and C); supra notes 31-33 and accompanying
text.
143. See Martino v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Garofalo's Finer Foods, Inc), 186 B.R. 414 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (holding that purely subjective interpretation of § 547(c)(2) would render subpart C
superfluous); see also Broome, supra note 3, at 86; Thomas AV. O'Neal, Protecting Long-Term
Transfers UnderBankruptcy's OrdinaryCourseDefense, 79 111. B.J. 342, 344 (1991).
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bankruptcy creditors as a class have a greater chance of being treated
equally because there are fewer creditors being favored. However,
employing this standard of equality, as opposed to use of that term in the
traditional sense of equality among all similarly situated creditors,
produces a losing situation for individual creditors whose services,
goods, and money could help keep a debtor out of bankruptcy. The point
is that equality is irrelevant to the application of § 547(c)(2), even
though, to a considerable extent, it should figure into the formulation of
the exception.'" The forty-five day limitation served that role in a
relatively principled manner. It ensured that any inroads on the general
equality goal in bankruptcy were limited to a particular type of credit
arrangement where the goals of the exception were most squarely and
unambiguously implicated placing creditors on an equal footing by
incorporating an industry standards component into the ordinary course
of business defense might be effective in simply limiting the absolute
number of cases to which the exception pertains now that the forty-five
day rule is no more. 45 The problem, however, as will be shown, 4 6 is that
in serving this limiting function the industry standards requirement,
unlike a temporal requirement, is incapable of discriminating between
those cases where the purposes for the exception are implicated and those
cases where they are not.
The creditors' losing situation is exemplified by the Ninth Circuit's
unpublished opinion in Unicom Computer Corp. v. International
Business Machines Corp. (In re Unicom Computer Corp.). 4 7 In Unicom,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's finding that forty
payments to IBM (the creditor) that followed "a pattern of dealing
established well before the preference period" were well within the
144. It is not fair to criticize an exception on the basis that it is contrary to the general rule. See
Countryman, supra note 3, at 775 (calling for repeal of § 547(c)(2) on this basis). Several
commentators have fallen into the logical trap of requiring the exception to be faithful to the rule.
See text accompanying supra note 63. Structurally, however, it is the nature of an exception to
advance a purpose different, and even at odds with, the rule it qualifies. Thus, in the application of
§ 547(c)(2) it is irrelevant that the defense does not fit within the broader purposive objectives of the
rule, provided that the exception is narrowly drafted and properly contained so as not to eclipse the
rule. It is in this latter sense, that is to say in theformulation of the exception, that equality policy
plays a pivotal role.
145. It is also possible, of course, that equality considerations of this ilk pcorly serve even this
more narrow function of preventing the exception from enveloping the rule. Thus, as is developed
more fully, infra text accompanying notes 257-259, we believe inclusion of some temporal
connection between the incurring of the debt and the payment as an element of the defense would
serve as a more principled limitation on the scope of the exception.
146. See infra part WV.C.
147. No. 92-17070, 1994 WL 134191 (9th Cir. Apr. 13, 1994).
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ordinary business exception. 48' Even though the debtor in this case
always paid late, IBM's failure to prove that its practices complied with
industry standards allowed the trustee to avoid most of the payments at
issue. 49 In Unicom, the benefit of the preference law clearly went to the
trustee and the unsecured creditors as a group who shared equally in a
somewhat larger debtor's estate. The direct loser was IBM, the creditor
that had continued to conduct business as usual with the debtor during its
slide into bankruptcy,"'0 and for whom no one is likely to shed crocodile
tears. However, the real losers are future customers who, as a result of
this holding, can expect the screws to be tightened as soon as word of
their financial problems spreads. The point is that the result in the case
might have been perfectly justified to the extent the transfers at issue
were either installment payments made on a term loan extended long
before the debtor encountered financially troubled waters or made on
account of an isolated, non-recurring transaction. Special treatment in
those circumstances could neither be justified on the basis of equity nor
as providing incentive to induce creditor assistance in keeping the debtor
alive and out of bankruptcy. Defending the outcome becomes much more
problematic, however, when the payments at issue are on account of
debts for supplies and materials needed for current operations and
incurred by the debtor in a perilous economic climate.
Although the debtor in the Unicorn case obviously failed anyway, it is
neither appropriate nor wise to assess the merits of the rule based purely
on an ex post perspective aided by the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.
Unquestionably, in the actual case, as in any case where bankruptcy
actually ensues, the equities appear strongly in favor of permitting the
estate's recovery of the challenged payments so as to ensure substantially
equal treatment among general creditors. The counterargument, however,
is that not every case ends up in bankruptcy, only the ones we see. By
contrast, therefore, when the situation is examined from an ex ante
perspective the picture develops a little differently, and, concomitantly,
so does the analysis. The crippling effect that any interruption in the flow
of routine, ordinary course credit can have on even a healthy debtor tends
to operate in favor of a standard that protects such transactions in the
148. Id. at *1-2.
149. See id. at *3.
150. The 40 payments at issue, totaling over $730,000, were made pursuant to invoices that IBM
had sent the debtor primarily for installation of equipment on the premises of the debtor's clients,
and also for other services. Accordingly, while it is somewhat unclear from the decision, it appears
these payments were on account of current services that permitted the debtor to continue to operate
in the critical days prior to bankruptcy. Id. at *1.
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hope that they might help avert a bankruptcy entirely. Such a standard
would, necessarily, protect these transactions without regard to the
creditor's awareness of the debtor's financial situation at the time the
credit is extended or either parties' state of mind at the time payment
thereon is received.' This point begins to illustrate why an objective
approach to ordinary business terms, particularly to the extent it is
defined in terms of industry standards, is an awkward and ineffective
mechanism for accomplishing the purposive aims of the exception.
The objective approach creates several more problems aside from
"punishing" a creditor for doing business as usual. For example,
although the majority of courts have uniformly adopted the objective
requirement of industry standards, proof of these standards is not
uniform among the circuits.' 52 The basic method for examining industry
terms can be described as follows: If there is any proof that similar
businesses as a whole deal on the same terms that the particular creditor
and debtor did, then the transfers may be protected under the
exception.'5 3 When the proof is lacking, however, the exception cannot
stand.'54 This basic examination is not always followed, however,
especially as creditors and courts become more creative with their
definition of industry terms. Consequently, courts have deviated from the
basic proof requirements by (1) manipulating the definition of the proper
industry,'5 5 (2) establishing a range of terms that can satisfy the
subsection C's "ordinary business terms" requirement, 6 and (3) deemphasizing the significance of industry terms in certain cases.' 57 Some
of these deviations undermine the purpose of the exception; others
arguably support it. Regardless, a consistent interpretation of industry

151. See Ponoroff, supra note 3, at 1492; infra notes 250-252 and accompanying text.
152. See generally Braunstein v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. (In re Broderick), No. 92-11974-CJK, 1996
Bankr. LEXIS 105 (Bankr. D. Md. Jan. 4, 1996).
153. See Sulmeyer v. Pacific Suzuki (In re Grand Chevrolet, Inc.), 25 F.3d 728, 733 (9th Cir.
1994) (finding that because banks generally take from two weeks to one month to honor 72-hour
automobile purchase draft, late payments satisfy exception); see also Bell Flavor, & Fragrances, Inc.
v. Andrew (In re Loretto Winery, Ltd.), 107 B.R. 707, 709 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989); cf Iannacone v.
Klement Sausage Co. (In re Hancock-Nelson Mercantile Co.), 122 B.R. 1006, 1011-12 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1991) (noting that one effect of overlaying objective standard is to lessen availability of
exception for late or irregular payments).
154. See Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp. (In re Fred Hawes Org.), 957 F.2d 239, 246 (6th Cir. 1992)
(finding that only evidence of industry standards came from creditor's president whose testimony
was suspect due to his position).
155. See infra text accompanying notes 159-182.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 183-206.
157. See infra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
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terms is lacking and unlikely to ever be settled satisfactorily. This erodes
the goal of the ordinary course of business exception and, at the same
time, negates any attempt to justify an industry standards approach as
advancing the important commercial policies of finality and repose.'5 8
a.

Defining the ProperIndustry

Some courts have defined the relevant industry narrowly. In AdvoSystem, Inc. v. Maxvay Corp.,'59 the Fourth Circuit analyzed subsection
C using the creditor's own business as the proper industry. 6 Advo, the
creditor, argued that as the only nationwide, direct-mail marketing firm,
it alone represented the industry.' 6' The court assumed arguendo that
Advo's assertion was true, but still refused to protect the transfers at
issue, finding that the credit terms Advo extended to the debtor
represented a gross departure from its ordinary practices with other
customers. 62
Using the creditor itself as the industry undermines the point of
looking at the industry as a whole. The Third Circuit has agreed: "[J]ust
as one swallow does not a spring make, one firm does not an industry
make." 63 Such a narrow definition of "industry" not only raises the risk
that all of the debtor's creditors are on less than an equal footing, but also
creates anomalies among same-industry debtors that deal with different
suppliers. At the same time, however, Advo-System also served to expose
the imprudence of the industry standards approach. By limiting its
inquiry to the creditor's own practices with the customers, the court's
158. See generally Tabb, supra note 3, at 1026-29 (discussing policy of repose as justification for
ordinary course of business exception).
159. 37 F.3d 1044 (4th Cir. 1994).
160. Id. at 1050-51.
161. Id.; ef Hovis v. Powers Constr. Co. (In re Hoffman Assocs., Inc.), 194 B.R. 943, 955 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1995) (refusing to accept defendant's contention that relevant industry in this case was
industry composed of entities in which debtor's principal had ownership interest, and not
construction industry at large).
162. See Advo-System, 37 F.3d at 1050-51.
163. Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc.), 18
F.3d 217, 227 (3d Cir. 1994). Of course, the FiberLite court did acknowledge that an "exceptionally
large firm may be an industry into itself." Id. However, there is also authority for the proposition that
"the proclivities of a monopolistic enterprise may not necessarily constitute ordinarily business
terms." Bulan v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (In re Al Cohen's Rye Bread Bakery, Inc.), 202 B.R.
546, 548 (Bank-r. E.D.N.Y. 1996). The Advo-System definition of the relevant industry also appears
to be in conflict with the Sixth Circuit's approach articulated in Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp. (In re
Fred Hawes Org., Inc.), 957 F.2d 239, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1992). See supra text accompanying notes
134-137.
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analysis was faithful to the stated purpose of the exception-to allow
normal business relations during the crisis period to continue in the
regular course. An examination of how the defendant-creditor deals with
all of its debtors provides no less assurance that the creditor did nothing
"unusual" when dealing with the now-bankrupt debtor then would an
examination of the practices of the defendant-creditor's competitors. The
point to be made, however, is that the former analysis is not an industry
standards analysis in any normal sense of the term. Nevertheless, courts
such as the Fourth Circuit in Advo-System fail to appreciate that
distinction in their articulation, as distinguished from their application, of
the standard.
The Sixth Circuit also has permitted the creditor's own practices to
define the relevant industry, but only under special circumstances. In
Luper v. Columbia Gas, Inc. (In re Carled,Inc.), 6 the trustee sought to
set aside payments made by the debtor for gas service to its three
restaurants. Testimony reflected that the payments were made late, but
within the billing cycle, a pattern that was not only typical of the debtor's
payment practices, but those of a number of the defendant, Columbia's,
other commercial customers as well. 65 Columbia also introduced
evidence relating to the billing practices of several public utilities from
other states with which Columbia was affiliated, and one other utility
operating in Ohio. Columbia explained the absence of additional
evidence relating to the practices of its direct competitors based on the
proprietary nature and general unavailability of such information.' 66
After reviewing and rejecting the standards for determining compliance
with "ordinary business terms"'67 applied by the lower courts, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that "Columbia's evidence showed that it is not
aberrational, unusual, or idiosyncratic for utility companies to accept late
payment on their invoices as long as payment is received within the
forty-one day billing cycle,"' 68 and, thus allowed the transfer to stand.'69
164. 91 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 1996).
165. According to the testimony of one of its managers, 20% of Columbia's customers, including
10% of its commercial customers, paid their bills after the 30th day in the billing c.ycle. Id. at 814.
166. Id.; cf .4l Cohen's Rye Bread Bakery, 202 B.R. at 548 (stating that for utilities, ordinary
business terms should be defined by applicable regulatory mandates).
167. The bankruptcy and district courts ruled that Columbia was required to show that particular
customers routinely paid their bills late. More specifically, the bankruptcy court held that Columbia
must show a pattern of lateness for a significantpercentage of its customers in order to satisfy the
third prong of § 547(c)(2). Luper v. Columbia Gas, Inc. (In re Carled, Inc.), 170 B.R. 355, 358
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 91 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 1996).
168. Luper, 91 F.3d at 818.
169. Id.
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In Tolona Pizza,7 ' the Seventh Circuit appeared to adopt an
intermediate position. Initially, the court acknowledged that it is difficult
to define the industry whose norms will govern any particular case. 7'

The court was able, however, to relegate that inquiry to secondary
importance by noting that the creditor does not have to establish a single,
uniform industry norm, irrespective of whatever "the industry" may be.
Instead, the creditor need only demonstrate that the payment in question

did not exceed the "outer limits of normal industry practices,' 72 with the
relevant industry flexibly defined. Thus, the creditor in Tolona Pizza was
able to sustain its burden that the payment was made according to
ordinary business terms even though the creditor apparently dealt
differently with the debtor than it did with the vast bulk of its customers,
and differently than the way that most of the creditor's competitors dealt
with their open accounts. 73 At bottom, Tolona Pizza might be read as
establishing a very low standard for satisfying the objective test in
subsection C, namely, that the payment arrangement not be wholly
unknown in the specific or related industries." Nevertheless, others have
interpreted Tolona Pizza as requiring a creditor to present at least some
evidence of its competitors practices in order to establish compliance
with the "ordinary business terms" requirement of subsection C, 75 and
170. In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1993).
171. Id. at 1033. In this case, the trustee sought to recover eight payments made by the debtor, a
pizza maker, to its sausage supplier. In deciding which industry's norms should govern, the court
noted that the possibilities included the sale of sausage to makers of pizza, the sale of sausages to
anyone, or the sale of anything to makers of pizza. Id.
172. See infra notes 187-190 and accompanying text. In Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin
Indus., Inc.), 78 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second Circuit seemed to endorse this view in general,
holding that the payment for which protection is sought must fall within the bounds of ordinary
practice of others similarly situated, but abjured from making a conclusive determination. Id. at 3941. Instead, the court stated that the determination of the relevant industry should be left to the
bankruptcy courts to make on a case-by-case basis heavily dependent on the factual circumstances
present in the individual case. Id.
173. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Flaum argued that the creditor had failed to make a sufficient
showing that the challenged payments were made in accordance with industry standards in order to
"defeat the inference that the payments were preferential." Tolona Pizza, 3 F.3d at 1034 (Flaum, J.,
dissenting). In essence, the dissent points up how weak the evidence of conformity to industry
practice and standards really was, despite the fact that the majority used this decision as the occasion
to adopt the objective approach to the "ordinary business terms" language in § 547(c)(2)(C). Id.
(Flaum, J., dissenting).
174. This position is consistent with the view that subsection C serves a purely evidentiary
function to control self-serving testimony in those cases where the payment practice is absolutely
unknown in the industry. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Funds (In re
Jones Truck Lines, Inc.), No. 91-1547514, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 2031 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. Sept. 27,
1995); Steege v. AT&T (In re Superior Toy & Mfg. Co.), 183 B.R. 826 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995);

Washington Law Review

Vol. 72:5, 1997

the Seventh Circuit subsequently
confirmed this interpretation in In re
176
Midway Airlines, InC.
In Midway Airlines, the creditor, Jensen Cabinet, was a manufacturer
and supplier of custom cabinetry, selling primarily to airline industry
customers. Jensen received six invoice payments from the debtor,
Midway Airlines, within ninety days of the filing. In each case the
payment was late, although Jensen maintained that it never received
timely payments from any of its airline customers. The prhicipal issue on
appeal was whether the district court erred in finding against Jensen
based on Jensen's failure to introduce evidence of sales terms and
practices among its competitors. 17 Resolution of that issue required as a
threshold matter identifying the relevant industry. Jensen argued that
because the airlines are uniform in terms of their payment practices, the
court should consider the payment practices in the airline industry."' 8 The
trustee supported the bankruptcy court's definition which, over Jensen's
objection, included not only the practices employed by other cabinetry
companies, but also millwork firms selling to non-airline customers.' 79
Relying on its earlier opinion in Tolona Pizza, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the relevant industry was the creditor's, not the debtor's
industry. Thus, even though less than one percent of Jensen's business
was non-airline cabinetry work, and even though the airline industry
apparently dictated payment terms to its suppliers,' the court refused to
limit the industry definition to millwork firms employed by airline

Solow v. Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart (In re Midway Airlines, Inc.), 180 B.R. 1009
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995); NMI Sys., Inc. v. Pillard (In re NMI Sys., Inc.), 179 B.Y 357 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 1995); Kepler v. Aetna Fin. Co. (In re Ausman Jewelers, Inc.), 177 B.R. 282 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1995); Cocolat, Inc. v. Fisher Dev., Inc. (In re Cocolat, Inc.), 176 B.R. 540 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1995).
176. 69 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 1995). See infra text accompanying notes 177-179 for a more detailed
discussion of In re Midway Airlines.
177. Midway Airlines, 69 F.3d at 794. The bankruptcy court had granted the trustee's petition to
set aside the disputed payments on the ground that Jensen had failed to offer any evidence of its
competitors' credit practices. Id. The same basic issue is also discussed infra part IV.B.2.c.
178. Midway Airlines, 69 F.3d at 795. In view of the fact that virtually all of Jensen's business
was with airline industry customers, and the airlines apparently dictated payment terms to their
construction suppliers which the suppliers were powerless to alter, the argument that the bankruptcy
court erred in its ruling that the relevant industry included millwork firms selling to non-airline
customers was hardly specious. Ultimately, however, because of the court's insistence that evidence
of Jensen's practices with other customers could not alone establish the required proof that the
payments were made according to ordinary business terms, the question of what was the relevant
industry effectively was mooted.
179. Id.
180. Id at 796 n.4.
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customers. The effect of this determination was to foreclose any
opportunity for Jensen to argue that its relations and practices with its
other customers itself provided an "industry" using unified terms. Thus,
it seems, the current position of the Seventh Circuit in relation to the
question of which industry's standards will control is on the face of18it
directly in opposition to the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Advo-System, 1
and, at least to a certain extent, at odds with the more flexible approach
adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Carled.12 The confusion is exacerbated
by an even greater divergence of opinion on the related issues, to which
attention is turned next, of what is meant by "standards prevailing in the
industry," once the relevant industry has been defined, and what kind of
proof is necessary or required to establish conformity with those
standards.
b.

Defining the ProperStandards

1)

National Standards

Assuming the relevant industry has been identified, courts have
endorsed multiple interpretations for determining the applicable
standards within the industry. One view is a strict showing of national
industry standards. In Unicorn Computer Corp.' the Ninth Circuit found
thirty-two of forty preferential payments avoidable because the creditor
could not establish that nationwide industry standards regularly permitted
a debtor to pay more than thirty days after payment was due.'84 Despite
evidence that the debtor and creditor had a pattern of payments beyond
the thirty-day grace period, and that the creditor's local branch had
sometimes dealt with other debtors the same way, the court required a
181. In Advo-System, it will be recalled, the court looked to the dissimilarity between the
payments in question and the creditor's usual practices with its other customers. Advo-System, Inc.
v. Maxway Corp., 37 F.3d 1044, 1050-51 (4th Cir. 1994); supra text accompanying notes 159-169.
Because, however, the court in Advo-System found that the defendant-creditor effectively comprised
the entire industry, the two decisions can be reconciled, but clearly the Fourth Circuit made its own
distinct contribution to the analysis of this question which represents an expansion of the parameters
set in by the Seventh Circuit in Tolona Pizza.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 164-169. It should be noted, however, that the Carled
opinion cites both Tolona Pizza and Midwest Airlines with approval. Luper v. Columbia Gas Co. (In
re Carled, Inc.), 91 F.3d 811, 815-16 (6th Cir. 1996).
183. No. 92-17070, 1994 WL 134191 (9th Cir. Apr. 13, 1994).
184. Id. at *2-*3. In Sulmeyer v. Pacific Suzuki (In re Grand Chevrolet, Inc.), 25 F.3d 728 (9th
Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit found, without extensive discussion, that the creditor satisfied its
burden of showing that the payments at issue were not unusual in relation to industry standards by
virtue of testimony from automobile financial industry experts. Id. at 733.
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showing of conformity with nationwide industry standards." 5 The court
then found such standards in IBM's national grace-period policy.'86
Apparently, because this policy was established in conjunction with an
"industry-wide trade association of equipment lessors," the court was
willing to accept it as evidence of the nationwide standard that other
similar creditors use. Upon application of the standard, the court found
only the eight transfers satisfying this criterion were entitled to protection
under the ordinary course of business defense.
Requiring every creditor to comply with nationwide standards not
only bears no relationship to the purposes of the preference law or the
preference defenses, but it interferes with the strong bankcruptcy policy
favoring rehabilitation. Many debtor-creditor relationships are local,
negotiated by local representatives, and tailored to meet local needs.
Bankruptcy law should not disrupt these relationships. Moreover,
requiring a creditor to prove a set of national standards is difficult. In
Unicom, the court looked to a policy that the creditor's main office had
worked out with a group of potential debtors. This approach ignores not
only local custom, but the particular terms and course of dealing between
the parties to the transactions, as well as the practices of similar creditors
that do not maintain a national policy. It may also adversely impact
smaller, local creditors to the extent that it requires them to demonstrate
compliance with a standard set by a national company.
2)

The Sliding Scale

Many courts allow a broad range of industry standards in determining
whether a particular payment satisfies the "ordinary business terms"
requirement. The Seventh Circuit in Tolona Pizza'87 established a lenient
definition of both industry and industry standards. While emphasizing
that subsection C clearly requires a showing of ordinariness outside of
the terms established between the specific creditor and debtor, the court
concluded that the creditor need not establish "the existence of some
single, uniform set of business terms." '8 Instead, the court interpreted
185. Unicorn Computer Corp., 1994 WL 134191, at *3. Arguably, this evidence would have been
sufficient to satisfy the Seventh Circuit under its more lenient definition of industry standards. See
infra text accompanying notes 187-190.
186. Unicorn Computer Corp., 1994 WL 134191, at *2.
187. In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1993).
188. Id. at 1032-33. Recently, the Second Circuit also endorsed the approach adopted by the
Seventh Circuit in Tolona Pizza. See Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.), 78 F.3d
30, 41 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing formulation as "the most reasonable interpretation of
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"ordinary business terms" as encompassing the range of terms in which
firms "similar in some general way to the creditor in question engage."' 9
Thus, only those payments made according to terms that are so
"idiosyncratic" that they fall outside the broad range of terms common in
the industry should be deemed outside of the exception. 9
In Molded Acoustical Products Inc., 9 ' the Third Circuit adopted the
Seventh Circuit's standard but with an important added twist. 92 The
Molded Acoustical court ruled that when interpreting ordinary business
terms, the duration of the parties' relationship plays a pivotal role. 93
"[T]he more cemented (as measured by its duration) the pre-insolvency
relationship between the debtor and the creditor, the more the creditor
will be allowed to vary its credit terms from the industry norm yet
remain within the safe harbor of § 547(c)(2).' 194 In Molded Acoustical,
the court initially accepted weak evidence of a forty-five day industry
standard. 95 Next, the court determined that an eighteen-month
relationship between the creditor and debtor, while "not extremely
lengthy, [was] of a sufficiently long duration that the relationship is
entitled to some leeway, meaning [the court] might approve a not
insubstantial departure from the established 45-day industry norm.' 96
The Third Circuit then suggested that even a fifty-eight day average may
§ 547(c)(2)(C) because it balances the competing interests involved with respect to voidable
preferences").
189. Tolona Pizza, 3 F.3d at 1033; accord Cocolat, Inc. v. Fisher Dev., Inc. (In re Cocolat, Inc.),
176 B.R. 540, 550 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that to satisfy subsection C defendant must
submit evidence that challenged transaction was consistent with practices common to businesses
similar to debtor and transferee). In Kepler v. Aetna Fin. Co. (In re Ausman Jewelers, Inc.), 177 B.R.
282 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1995), the court refused to allow the defendant the benefit of the ordinary
course of business defense where the defendant failed to supply any evidence that the transaction
was ordinary for the industry as a whole.
190. Tolona Pizza, 3 F.3d at 1033. But see Advo-System., Inc. v. Maxway Corp., 37 F.3d 1044,
1050 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that evidence of ordinary business terms cannot be at too high level of
generality).
191. Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc.), 18
F.3d 217, 227 (3d Cir. 1994).
192. Id. at224.
193. Id.; accord Huffmnan v. New Jersey Steel Corp. (In re Valley Steel Corp.), 182 B.R. 728,
739-40 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1995); Solow v. Hilton Inn of Oak Lawn, Ltd. (In re Midway Airlines,
Inc.), No. 95-C-0023, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7501 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 1995) (commenting on
expansion of Tolona Pizza accomplished by Third Circuit in Molded Acoustical, but determining
that, even if applicable in Seventh Circuit, it would not aid defendant that failed to offer any
evidence of industry norms).
194. Molded Acoustical, 18 F.3d at 225.
195. Id. at 227.
196. Id.
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be in that window. Nevertheless, because during the preference period
the average time for payment greatly exceeded what it had been for the
greater part of the debtor-creditor relationship prior to the preference
that the transfers under scrutiny could still be
period, the court concluded
19 7
preferences.
as
recovered
Following Molded Acoustical, the bankruptcy court in Huffman v.
New Jersey Steel Corp. (In re Valley Steel Corp.)9 ' observed that:
The emphasis on the duration of the parties' relationship serves to
effectuate the two major policies of the law of preferences. By
offering some protection to creditors who are willing to deal with
troubled businesses, the possibility of survival will increase for
businesses that are on the edge of bankruptcy, but still susceptible
to resuscitation. Moreover, the likelihood of undiscovered
overreaching by a preferred creditor is minimized if an enduring
relationship is available to compare with the creditor's conduct
during the preference period. Conversely, where the relationship is
short, the terms must be consistent with the objective norms of the
creditor's industry to avoid the appearance and risk of favoritism.1 99
Of course, these same statements might just as easily have been made in
justifying the pre-1992 standards governing "ordinary business terms"
that relied exclusively on the past dealings of the parties, except in those
limited circumstances where no such prior course of conduct existed. 00
Put another way, for better or worse, application of the sliding scale
rule appears to abrogate the objective requirement of subsection C by
approving transfers made within a long standing relationship, even
though they are contrary to industry practice. As the Third Circuit
197. Id. at 227-28. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit explicitly adopted the sliding scale
determination of industry standards. See Advo-System, Inc. v. Maxway Corp., 37 F.3d 1044, 1050
(4th Cir. 1994). The court cautioned, however, that this approach "never tolerates a gross departure
from the industry norm, not even when the parties have an established and steady relationship." Id.
The Second Circuit has neither accepted nor rejected Advo-System's embellishment on the Tolona
Pizza standard, instead determining that defining the relevant industry standards is appropriately left
to the bankruptcy courts to decide as a question of fact heavily dependent upon the circumstances in
each case. However, at least one bankruptcy court in the Sixth Circuit has expressly declined to
accept the argument that payments made outside the "broad range of terms" referred to in Tolona
Pizza may nevertheless be considered according to ordinary business terms because of a longstanding relationship between the parties. See Frank v. Volvo Penta of the Ams. (In re Thompson
Boat Co.), 199 B.R. 908, 915-16 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (relying on Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp.
(In re Fred Hawes Org., Inc.), 957 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1992)).
198. 182 B.R. 728 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1995).
199. Id. at 740.

200. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
recognized: "[W]e think that a trade debt payment made according to
longstanding practice between two solvent parties most often does not
'prefer' that creditor to the disadvantage of the debtor or other
creditors."' ' We are in full agreement, but this appreciation only serves
to call into question the wisdom of the original decision to rely on
industry standards in the first place. In addition, despite the apparent
pull-back, which the Molded Acoustical approach represents, "industry
standards" has become firmly rooted in the articulation of what is meant
by "ordinary business terms" in subsection C and, thus, the potential for
further mischief exists each time the standard is invoked.
Paradoxically, then, the result of this sliding scale when carried to its
logical conclusion is that the courts that follow this approach could end
up in many cases determining the "industry terms" by looking solely at
the parties' past practice." 2 For example, in Molded Acoustical, the court
explained:
But what is clearly the dispositive factor in this case, which allows
us to conclude as a matter of law that the payments at issue here
were not "made according to ordinary business terms," is the
evidence that the terms dominating throughout the pre-insolvency
relationship between the parties . . . were far shorter than the
preference ... period payment terms.0 3
So construed, the sliding scale actually signals a return of sorts to the
subjective interpretation of section 547(c)(2)(C). Obviously, a subjective
approach supports neither Judge Posner's vision of, nor his explanation
of the purposes for, the "ordinary business terms" requirement.2 °4 On the
201. MoldedAcoustical, 18 F.3d at 225.
202. But see Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RM.L., Inc. v. Conceria Sabrina, S.P.A.
(In re R.M.L., Inc.), 195 B.R. 602 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1996) (raising serious question as to whether or
not under Molded.Acoustical creditor could fail to proffer any evidence of industry standard and still
qualify for protection under ordinary course of business defense).
203. Molded Acoustical, 3 F.3d at 228. Another good example of how the "sliding scale"
approach can result in scant attention being paid to pervading industry practices is NMI Sys., Inc. v.
Pillard (In re NMI Sys., Inc.), 179 B.R 357 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1995). The alleged preference in that
case involved bonus payments made to an employee of the debtor-corporation. The court found that
the bonus arrangement was incurred, and the bonus draws paid, in the ordinary course of the
financial affairs of the debtor and the company. As to the requirement of "according to ordinary
business terms," the court concluded that this element was satisfied since the bonus payments were
not a "flagrant departure" from relevant industry norms and the parties had engaged in this
arrangement for a substantial period of time predating the company's insolvency. Id. at 373-74 nn.6,
7. Thus, the defendant was able to assert successfully the ordinary course of business defense in the
case without, as a practical matter, producing any evidence to show similarity of the payments under
scrutiny with payment practices followed by competitors or other companies in the industry.

204. See supra text accompanying notes 139-14 1.
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other hand, it does advance the policy of allowing business to continue as
usual which is, after all, both the stated purpose and the most defensible
justification for the exception. Therefore, despite the circuitous process
used to achieve that result, this modified approach could represent an
acceptable accommodation of relevant policy goals, but for the
continuing problem created by the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling
extending the defense to payments on long-term debt.2"5 The issues may
be analytically discrete, but, as discussed below, 0 6 the two questions
inevitably conflate and, practically speaking, need to be addressed at the
same time.
3)

Healthy vs. TroubledDebtors

Another wrinkle that has arisen in assessing compliance with an
objective industry terms standard has been gauging the effect of the
difference between terms that creditors use when dealing with troubled
debtors as opposed to healthy debtors. In Jones v. United Savings &
Loan Association (In re US.A. Inns),207 the Eighth Circuit endorsed a
view that was lenient toward creditors that adjusted or restructured their
payment terms to accommodate troubled debtors. In US.A. Inns, the
debtor was in default and made payments to the creditor according to a
"workout process." 208 Recognizing that ordinary business terms will vary
from industry to industry, the court found that such payments could fall
within the exception.2 9 Because the creditor presented ample evidence
that it was a common industry practice to work with a troubled debtor as
long as it remitted some form of payment, the court concluded that the
creditor satisfied subsection C.210 In Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re

205. See infra notes 249-251 and uccompanying text.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 253-254.
207. 9 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 1993).
208. Id. at 685.
209. Id. (noting that proof of ordinary business terms "requires evidence of a prevailing practice
among similarly situated members of the industry facing the same or similar prcblems"); see also
Gray v. Huntsman Chemical Corp. (In re Dooley Plastics Co.), 185 B.R 389, 394 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1995) (implying that specific proof of similar workout arrangements with other delinquent debtors
might be sufficient).
210. U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 685-86. The Fourth Circuit has also implied that evidence supporting
an industry standard to work with troubled debtors would be enough to satisfy subsection C. See
Advo-System, Inc. v. Maxway Corp., 37 F.3d 1044, 1051-52 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the AdvoSystem court ultimately determined that the record "clearly show[ed] that it was unusual for [the
creditor] to extend credit and it was unusual for [the creditor] to work with delinquent customers."

Id. at 1052.

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
Roblin Industries, Inc.), the Second Circuit signaled its concurrence
with U.S.A. Inns when it expressly rejected the bankruptcy court's
determination that the payment in question could not be protected under
section 547(c)(2) because a restructured payment on a defaulted debt can
never be considered ordinary.
Specifically, the court observed:

"Restricting a creditor to courses of action typical in untroubled times
leaves no room for realistic debt workouts and unfairly penalizes those
creditors that take conventional steps to institute a repayment plan."2 3
In direct contrast to this approach, the Tenth Circuit refused to adopt
the troubled-debtor interpretation in Clark v. BalcorReal Estate Finance,
214 In Meridith Hoffman, the
Inc. (In re Meridith Hoffman Partners).
debtor and creditor entered into an escrow agreement that evidence
showed to be common with delinquent debtors.2"' The court found that
such an arrangement clearly contradicted the "dangers that the preference
section seeks to avoid," because the creditor may be given an advantage
as a result of such arrangements.2 6 Under Meridith Hoffman, "ordinary
business terms" are only those used "in ordinary circumstances, when
' As a consequence of the antipodal holdings of
debtors are healthy."217
Meridith Hoffman and U.S.A. Inns, late payments and payments made
pursuant to special arrangements deliberately intended and designed to
keep the debtor out of bankruptcy are avoidable without exception in at
least one but not all circuits.
211. 78 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996).
212. Id. at41-42.
213. Id. at 42 (citing U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 1993)); accordBulan v. Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp. (In re Al Cohen's Rye Bread Bakery, Inc.), 202 B.R. 546 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(declining to adopt view that payment made pursuant to debt restructuring agreement can never be
ordinary); Braunstein v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. (In re Broderick Co.), No. 92-11974-CIK, 1996 Bankr.
LEXIS 105, at *29-*31 (Bankr. D. Mass. Jan. 4, 1996) (noting that taking measures to accommodate
troubled debtor is consistent with aim of ordinary course of business exception, which is to leave
normal debtor-creditor relationships undisturbed). But see Frank v. Volvo Penta of the Ams. (In re
Thompson Boat Co.), 199 B.R. 908, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (expressly rejecting holding of
U.S.A. Inns as providing no limit to what would be ordinary business terms).
214. 12 F.3d 1549 (10th Cir. 1993).
215. Id. at 1554.
216. Id. at 1553 (holding that "ordinary business terms" are those used by parties when debtors
are "healthy," and that arrangements that creditors use when debtor is struggling may give creditor
advantage over others and, thus, detract from general policy of preference section); accordKirtley v.
Consolidated Nutrition, L.C. (In re Freeny), 187 B.R. 711,716 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1995).
217. Meridith Hoffman, 12 F.3d at 1553; see also Jobin v. McKay (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.),
84 F.3d 1330 (10th Cir. 1996) (reaffirming holding in Meridith Hoffman), petitionfor cert..fled, 65
U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1996) (No. 96-569). But see Luper v. Columbia Gas Co. (In re Carled,
Inc.), 91 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 1996) (declining to take position of whether special rule of
ordinariness ought to apply for industry participants in distress).
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Limiting industry standards to relationships with healthy debtors is
unrealistic. Creditors inevitably encounter troubled debtors within the
ordinary course of their businesses and sophisticated businesses
generally have set policies for dealing with troubled debtors.
Discouraging creditors from using other terms to deal with delinquency
undermines the objective of continuing normal business relations and
interferes with the ultimate goal of minimizing the absolute number of
business failures." 8 The problem, however, is that it is in the nature of an
industry norms approach to exclude from the range of "ordinary" terms
those made specially to accommodate a financially beleaguered debtor.
Thus, the Meridith Hoffman holding, while perhaps unduly harsh and
unquestionably contrary to the purposive objectives of the preference
law, is also quite rational and even defensible given the initial premise
(however dubious) that the "ordinary business terms" language in section
547(c)(2)(C) should be defined with reference to the credit practices
employed by other noncreditor parties in the industry.
The foregoing indicates that the shift to an objective standard was
flawed in conception and has proved unworkable in application. By
allowing courts to manipulate the definition of the industry and the
proper standards within the industry, the objective approach seems to
have become little more than a way for courts to implement their own
views of the ordinary course of business exception, and, more generally,
their own visions about what makes a transfer a preference to begin

218. In Meridith Hoffman, the court stated that:
The preference section does not discourage "unusual action" simply because others in the
industry wouldn't respond to similar circumstances in the same way. It discoarages "unusual
action" that may favor certain creditors or hasten bankruptcy by alarming other creditors and
motivating them to force the debtor into bankruptcy to avoid being left out.
12 F.3d at 1553. Obviously, the court's fixation was on deterrence of precipitous collection activity
and transfers obtained with the motivation of achieving a preferential advantage. There is, however,
another view of the end to be achieved by the policy of "not disturbing normal financial relations."
That is, that it encourages creditors that supply critical operating capital to continue to do business
with the debtor, thus preserving the hope that the debtor will be able to stay afloat long enough to
reverse its financial misfortunes. This view of the purpose for § 547(c)(2) recognizes a more flexible
standard for troubled debtors. See Cocolat, Inc. v. Fisher Dev., Inc. (In re Cocolat, Inc.), 176 B.R.
540, 550 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that creditors may exert some degree of collection
pressure without rendering resulting payment outside of ordinary course). Of course, this view of the
purpose of the ordinary course defense presumes that the exception should be limited to short-term
debt. See infra text accompanying note 250; see also Miller v. Kibler (In re Wint.zrs), 182 B.R. 26,
29 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1995) (observing that it is clear that § 547(c)(2) applies only where debtor and
transferee have "on-going, 'recurring' business relationship").

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
with.219 Moreover, as discussed in the material to follow, in certain key
respects this vision of the preference law contains an antiquated, but
stubbornly persistent, notion that what makes a transfer a preference is
the intent to prefer, rather than the preferential effect.
c.

Proving Compliance with Industry Standards

Even once the relevant industry standards have been located and
identified, an issue of considerable practical importance remains. How
does the creditor go about proving that in this particular instance the
payment the trustee is seeking to recover complied with those standards?
In Tolona Pizza, the Seventh Circuit created a strong impression that
proof of conformity with the creditor's practice with respect to other
same-industry debtors would not suffice.22 Then, in Midway Airlines, the
court eliminated any lingering doubt about the issue, emphasizing the
need for the creditor to come forward with specific evidence of the
practices and payment terms used by the creditor's competitors.22'
However, the court in Midway Airlines specifically ruled that this
evidence need not consist of either expert testimony or testimony directly
from representatives of the defendant-creditor's competitors. Instead, the
court observed that, while these two sources of proof are available to
creditors, showing compliance with industry practices might be
established in other ways, such as testimony by the creditor's own
executives.222
219. See, e.g., Weisberg supra note 3, at 124-26 (describing range of different judicial attitudes to
defense, but concluding that "[t]he norm underlying section 547(c)(2) can be characterized as a mens
rea standard").
220. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
221. Accord Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus.), 78 F.3d 30, 43 (2d Cir. 1996);
Fitzpatrick v. Rockwood Water, Wastewater & Natural Gas Sys. (In re Tennessee Valley Steel
Corp.), 201 B.R. 927,936-37 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (indicating that because timely payments are
presumed to be norm in natural gas industry, if challenged payments were made in timely fashion
that should obviate need for "industry standards" analysis altogether); Sacred Heart Hosp. v. E.B.
O'Reilly Servicing Corp. (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 200 B.R. 114 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996); Hassett
v. Goetzmann (In re CIS Corp), 195 B.R. 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996); Dery v. Detroit Edison (In re
Dobbs Inc.), No. 94-CV-71689-DT, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16303, *15-*17 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29,
1995); Milwaukee Cheese Wis., Inc. v. Straus (In re Milwaukee Cheese Wis., Inc.), 191 B.R. 397,
401 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1995); Gilbert v. Blosser Color Lab., Inc. (In re Centric Communications,
Inc.), No. 94-329, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1556 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 1995); cf. In re Carled, 91
F.3d at 819 (accepting evidence to effect that obtaining information concerning competitors' billing
practices was not possible as excuse from requirement of presenting such information in order to
satisfy subsection C).
222. In re Midway Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 792, 796-97 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Solow v.
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart (In re Midway Airlines, Inc.), 180 B.R. 1009, 1015-17
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There is a subtle illogicalness in the court's insistence in Midway
Airlines on evidence that the transactions at issue comported with the
practices of similar businesses, and, at the same time, in its willingness to
acquiesce in such proof in the form solely of testimony from the
representative of the defendant-creditor. Obviously, if one of the
concerns addressed by the ordinary terms requirement is, as Judge
Posner suggested, to police "special deals" between debtor and
creditor,2 3 it makes little sense to accept as proof of ordinary business
terms testimony from the very party whose objectivity and veracity are
open to question in the first place. Although it may be the case that the

existence of this potential bias should only affect the weight accorded
and not the admissibility of the testimony, that is something quite
different from saying that no additional kind of proof is needed. In fact,
permitting the defendant's testimony alone to satisfy the industry terms
standard belies the original purpose for an objective standard, which is to

bring to bear a neutral, outside evaluation of conduct.224 Nevertheless,
under Midway Airlines, the defendant-creditor's testimony could be
regarded as not just probative, but actually dispositive of the issue of

compatibility with industry-wide practices. In our view, all of this
demonstrates the magnitude of the error in judgment and methodology
entailed in the initial decision to employ an industry terms test for
satisfying an objective approach to subsection C. In the final analysis,
that may be the most telling point to be made here. 2"

(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that testimony from debtor's managing partner as to range of credit
practices used by similar firms was sufficient proof of industry business terms).
223. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
224. An instructive analogy can be found in the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 1-201(19)
contains the general definition of "good faith," which adopts a subjective standard of honesty in fact.
U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1994). However, in Article 2, in the case of merchants, there is a supplemental
definition of "observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C.
§ 2-103(1)(b) (1994). The inclusion of an objective standard in this context is intended to make clear
that in the case of a merchant, a good heart, and an empty head will not necessarily satisfy the
requirement of good faith when, judged by generally accepted standards in the trade, the merchant's
exercise ofjudgment was not reasonable. See, e.g., Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272
(Ala. 1979) (involving merchant-buyer's attempt to reject goods as not being satisfactory). Of
necessity, then, and in spite of the court's allusion in Midway to the contrary, a creditor seeking to
establish conformity with industry practices will never be well advised to rely solely on testimony
from its own personnel. Thus, the practical effect of the core holding in Midway will be to increase
the complexity, and correspondingly the expense, of litigation under § 547(c)(2), a result that inures
to nobody's benefit, not to the creditor's, not to the estate's, and not to the system's.
225. We would propose to eliminate any industry-wide comparison from the analysis of the
ordinary course of business defense. See infra text accompanying notes 272-275.

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
The other justification offered in Tolona Pizza for requiring proof of
industry standards, that of serving an evidentiary function,226 even more
palpably reveals the circularity in reasoning going on in the case law. If
some resemblance to common industry practices is necessary to bolster
the inherently self-serving testimony of the defendant-creditor that the
payment arrangements at issue were normal for this debtor and creditor,
then certainly that objective is attained only if the testimony comes from
someone other than the party whose attestations are in need of
reinforcement. The suggestion in Midway Airlines that validation can be
supplied by the same party whose statement requires validation is,
therefore, an exercise in pure flummery, and necessarily implies that
either the formulation is itself misguided or the initial premise is in need
of reexamination. Because we do not believe that the testimony of
industry experts or competitors adds anything to the analysis of whether
the transfer should be protected from preference liability, we are
persuaded by the latter view. In short, we are convinced that a careful
examination of the prevailing approach to establishing conformity with
industry standards not only exposes the shortcomings in the current
interpretation of section 547(c)(2)(C) but strengthens the case for
legislative reform. 7
Two recent bankruptcy court cases sharply illustrate the uncertainty
created by the objective standard, an uncertainty exacerbated by the
differing views of courts as to the question of what constitutes sufficient
forms of proof as to adherence with industry terms. In Roberts v. Service
Transport, Inc. (In re Ideal Security Hardware Corp.),228 the trustee
sought to recover allegedly preferential transfers consisting of payments
made to a carrier that had hauled freight for the debtor on an open
account basis. The creditor argued that the payments were made in the
ordinary course of business based on an affidavit of its controller who
testified that the debtor was regularly late with its payments and that late
payments were common in the industry. Citing the bias of the affiant in
addition to the absence of other evidence of industry terms, the court
ruled that subsection C could not be satisfied by the self-serving
testimony of the defendant's officer "because it is to be expected that the
testimony of an officer of the defendant would be favorable to the

226. In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1993); see supra notes 139140.
227. See infra text accompanying notes 233-241.
228. 186 B.R. 237 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995).
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defendant's position., 229 In contrast, the defendant-creditor in McCord v.
Venus Foods, Inc. (In re Lan Yik Foods Corp.)"0 attempted to supply
proof of "ordinary business terms" by offering the testimony of its vicepresident to the effect that tolerance for late payments was not only the
defendant's normal practice with its customers but was also the normal
practice in the industry." Although this evidence was hardly any less
self-serving than that presented in Ideal Hardware,the court concluded
that such testimony could nevertheless suffice to establish "ordinary

business terms" for a particular industry, over the objection
of the
2
trustee, so long as there is no specific evidence to the contrary.
C.

Compatibilityof the Objective Approach with the Puiposefor an
OrdinaryCourse Exception

The objective standard in subsection C, as applied by the courts, is
incompatible with the goal of the ordinary course of business exception
for several reasons. First, in its basic form, the industry terms standard
"punishes" creditors for doing business as usual, whether ih is business as
usual with a long standing debtor who has come upon hard times or
whether it is business as usual according to local terms and not
nationwide standards. In direct contravention of the core policy
underlying the original six preference exceptions,233 an industry
standards requirement actually discourages individuals and business

229. Id. at 239 (citing Finley v. Mr. T's Apparel, Inc. (In re Washington Mfg. Co.), 144 B.R. 376,
380 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992)); see also Heyman v. Wvoldman (In re Elton Trucking, Inc.), No. 94B-17989, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 516 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. May 2, 1996) (observing that self-serving
statements are insufficient to establish requisite elements of defense under § 547(c)(2)); Trinkoff v.
Porters Supply Co. (In re Daedalean, Inc.), 193 B.R. 204 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (refusing to grant
summary judgment on creditor's § 547(c)(2) claim based on disagreement established by parties'
affidavits as to what standard industry practices were in regard to late payments); Anderson-Smith &
Assocs. v. Xyplex, Inc. (In re Anderson-Smith & Assocs., Inc.), 188 B.R. 679, 688 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1995) (noting that self-serving testimony is not determinative of ordinary course of dealings
between parties).
230. 185 B.R 103 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995).
231. Id. at 114.
232. Id.; see also McLaughlin v. Hoole Mach. & Engraving Corp. (In re Parkline Corp.), 185 B.Rt
164 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995) (holding that well-established relationship between debtor and creditor
permitted greater latitude in diverging from industry norms and, thus, testimony of defendant's
president and officers of another creditor to effect that late payments were common in industry was
sufficient to satisfy subsection C's ordinary business terms requirement).
233. The two exceptions added to § 547(c) subsequent to enactment of the Bankruptcy Code both
serve different sorts of objectives, and, for that reason, are open to some question in terms of their
concordance with the basic equality aim of the preference law. See supranote 30.

The Ordinary Course of Business Defense
concerns from continuing to engage in routine credit transactions with a
financially distressed debtor.
Second, the industry standards construction of the "ordinary business
terms" language in subsection C has the courts engaging in exercises to
define industry standards, and requisite levels of proof of compliance
with such standards, that are not only beyond the scope of bankruptcy
preference law, but that ultimately have nothing to do with bankruptcy
proceedings. The only conceivable justification for laboring to make
these distinctions would be to police intentional pre-bankruptcy transfers
intended to prefer one creditor over others. But even assuming that such
an inquiry mattered, there is absolutely no guarantee that compliance
with "industry standards" assures that the parties were not colluding to
favor the creditor over other unsecured claimholders. Thus, insistence on
proof of industry standards reflects nothing more than an antiquated and
futile attempt to retain some connection between moral culpability and
the formulation of what constitutes a voidable preference, an obsession
that has plagued the interpretation of the ordinary course of business
defense from the very start. Moreover, as we have attempted to show,
even if one accepts the validity of that objective, the industry standards
requirement has been ineffective in terms of actually inhibiting
opprobrious behavior on the part of ill-motivated debtors and creditors. 4
Third, the industry standards requirement is unpredictable for
creditors. Creditors cannot assume that conducting business according to
their own terms will be sufficient to permit the retention of payments
made in the ordinary course of business. As a result, creditors will be
forced to cut off debtors who are at risk of sinking into bankruptcy. This
severing of relations is typically much easier to do for a short-term
creditor on a recurring monthly debt obligation, or a creditor that is
financing current inventory purchases or covering the debtor's immediate
working capital requirements, than it is for a long-term financier with a
significant existing investment in the debtor-firm's capital structure.
Admittedly, a creditor in the former category is far less likely than one in
the latter to have much warning of the debtor's impending financial peril.
Nonetheless, the consequent risk of losing short-term operating financing
inevitably accelerates the slide into bankruptcy. This, in turn, subverts
the goals of the exception, which are to maintain ordinary business
234. See generally Weisberg, supra note 3, at 121-29 (describing how courts have consistently
managed to reimpose subjective criteria into analysis of voidable preferences in spite of legislative
efforts to objectify inquiry). See also In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir.
1993) (suggesting that one function of subsection is to allay fears that one or more creditors have
worked out special deals with debtor).
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relations, and, by so doing, facilitate the continuation of these
desperately needed short-term credit accommodations. 5
Fourth, the industry standards approach is not necessarily good
statutory interpretation as applied to section 547(c)(2)(C). "Ordinary
business terms" might refer just as easily to the particularsof the parties'
contracts as it does to the performanceof those contracts, suggesting that
it is the terms of the parties' agreements, not industry terms, that must be
examined.2 36 In this connection, the legislative history of section 547 is
instructive. It states: "This section . . . modernizes the preference
provisions and brings them more into conformity with commercial
practice and the Uniform Commercial Code." 7 In the U.C.C., "term" is
defined as "that portion of an agreement which relates to a particular
matter.""ns Thus, conformity with terms in the industry is not the only
possible meaning of "ordinary business terms"; rather the phrase could
just as easily encompass the terms of a particular debtor and creditor's
contract.
Fifth, industry standards are irrelevant to the goal of maintaining
normal business practices when parties have a longstanding relationship.
Examining the parties' practices alone indicates whether any unusual
practices have occurred in the pre-bankruptcy stage. The sliding scale
approach to defining industry standards implicitly recognizes this fact,
even if it misses the broader point about the proper scope of the
exception. 39
Finally, the emergence of the objective standard as an additional
barrier to establishing the ordinary course of business defense may be a
subliminal judicial response to the perceived devitalizing of the goals of
the preference law created by the combination of the 1984 Amendments
and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wolas. Indeed, the timing of
the shift in subsection C interpretation is curious. It can be explained two
235. Deterring wasteful collection actions in order to maximize value in bankruptcy is certainly
not incongruent with the of the preference law, but it is not the preeminent objective of the
preference defenses. See supra notes 28-29, 230 and accompanying text. For another criticism of an
objective standard of subsection C based on related concerns, see Thabit, supra note 15, at 498-509.
236. This argument was first advanced in Hon. Jo Ann C. Stevenson & Norman C. Witte,
Bankruptcy, 2 Det. C.L. Rev. 319, 338 (1993). The authors argued that the "objective test" should
compare the parties' contractual terms, rather than their course of performance, to an objective
standard. Id.
237. Id. at 339 (citing S. Rep. No. 95-989, § 87 (1978)).
238. U.C.C. § 1-201(42) (1989 & Supp. 11996); see also Stevenson & Witte, supra note 236, at
337 n.106 (distinguishing U.C.C. § 1-205(l), which defines "ordinary course of dealing," as less
analogous concept).
239. See supratext accompanying notes 201-206.
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ways. First, courts and trustees may indeed have been sufficiently
preoccupied with other aspects of the defense, such as, initially, the
operation of the forty-five day requirement and, later, the question of
whether payments on long-term debts could be considered within the
ordinary course of business, as to overlook the significance of the
separate requirement in subsection C of ordinary business terms. Once
those basic issues were settled in 1991,24o litigators and courts alike were
able to concentrate on other aspects of the defense. Consequently, they
"discovered" the long overlooked subsection C. The second, and perhaps
more realistic explanation for the shift from subjective to objective
interpretation of subsection C, is that the objective standard nominally
gives more credence to the equality principle of the preference law that
was dealt a severe blow by the one-two punch of the 1984 Amendments
and Wolas.24' The radical shift in interpretation, accomplished in an
extraordinarily short period of time, might, therefore, be indicative of a
reaction to the perceived threat to the preference law created by the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling that payments on long-term debt made in the
ordinary course of business may qualify for protection under section
547(c)(2).
Regardless of the stated or inferential reasons for the shift, and despite
our sympathy for the view that section 547(c)(2) after Wolas was
dangerously overbroad, the trend toward an objective interpretation is
leading courts in too many different directions. Even assuming that one
views the industry terms interpretation as a mechanism for constraining
the unbridled reach of the exception, thereby preventing section
547(c)(2) from subverting the role of the preference law in effectuating
bankruptcy's equality policy-there is still a serious problem of "fit"
created by the indiscriminate manner in which an industry terms outlook
corresponds with the goals of the exception. Transactions left
unprotected as a result of their failure to satisfy this new standard are no
more likely to be those undeserving of the protection of the exception as
they are to be ones that actually may have made a difference in terms of
assisting the debtor in fending off the inevitably of a trip to the
bankruptcy court. Clearly, then, not only is guidance needed to settle the
question of the expedient operation of subsection C, but, ideally, that
guidance must be oriented in a manner that is consonant with both the

240. See suprapart M.
241. But see supra text accompanying notes 144-145 (explaining why this is flawed conception
of bankruptcy equality).
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applicable statutory text and the larger goals of the preference law and
defenses.
V.

POSSIBLE REMEDIAL RESPONSES: REALIGNING
APPLICATION WITH PURPOSE

242
Despite relatively longstanding global criticism of the exception,
exacerbated by the more recent confusion over the proper interpretation
of subsection C, we do not favor the repeal of section 547(c)(2).243
Properly defined, the ordinary course of business defense serves a valid
purpose within commercial relations and bankruptcy law. It allows
debtors and creditors to continue normal financial relations and enhances
prospects for the debtor to remain out of bankruptcy altogether.
Historically, this defense has been rationalized with a distributive
equality explanation of the preference law,2' and that rationale applies
today with equal force. In its present form, however, section 547(c)(2)
has become wholly disassociated from any principled or defensible
justification for an ordinary course of business exception. Consequently,
several alternative proposals for reform have been proffered that, if
adopted, would tend to realign the exception's use with its purpose by
defining the phrase "ordinary business terms" in a manner that does not
create the intractable problems involved in deferring to industry
standards.
One alternative would be for courts to interpret, or preferably
Congress to reword, subsection C to read: "made according to ordinary
business terms as determined from the written agreements of the parties,
unless no such agreements exist, in which case the transfer shall have
been made according to ordinary business terms in the creditor's
industry., 245 This revision takes into account the concerns of the
objective standard, but only when they are relevant to protecting normal

242. At least two commentators, it will be recalled, have called for the outright repeal of
§ 547(c)(2). See supra note 58.
243. See generally Ponoroff, supra note 3, at 1492-94 (arguing that ordinary course of business
exception should be restored to its original incarnation and retained).
244. See supranote 41.
245. A related approach is that suggested in Stevenson & Witte, supra note 236, at 338-41, who,
first contend that extension of the objective standard to also require proof of general trade usage
within the industry accomplishes little, and then suggest in the alternative that the focus under
subsection C should be on whether the contract terms themselves, rather than the particular
transaction itself, conform to industry norms. Id at 338; see also Thabit, supra note 3, at 501-09
(rejecting industry terms approach to subsection C, as inconsistent with deterrence function of
preference law, and favoring approach that emphasizes prior dealings between parties).
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financial relations. Also, the word "terms" is further defined so as to
afford subsection C meaning distinct from the operation of subsections
A and B. Although this definition of "industry" is purposely vague, it
allows for some measure of flexibility from case to case. However, this
flexibility is limited to situations where the parties have failed to reduce
their payment terms and arrangements to writing. Of course, industry
terms, or at least the creditor's practices in its dealings with its other
debtors, would also continue to play a role under the subjective standards
in subsections A and B in circumstances where the payment is a firsttime transaction between the parties.246
A second, purely legislative, alternative would be to eliminate
subsection C entirely.247 Such a repeal would reinstate the original
subjective approach that the majority of courts followed prior to 1992.
Although many courts and commentators now disagree, the subjective
approach clearly satisfies the stated goal of the exception to protect
normal financial relations. Eliminating any objective component from
the analysis would also allow more flexibility for creditors to change
payment terms to assist struggling debtors without risking loss of
protection under § 547(c)(2), provided enough time has elapsed between
the change and the challenged transfers so as to establish the new
payment practice as ordinary. Concededly, it does not provide as
thorough of a "check" against "evil intentions" of debtors and creditors
as would an objective approach, but that is not really the point of the
exception. 241
Of these two options the first alternative may be most in tune with the
prevailing mood of the courts as it relates to this defense. Not only would
that option, if implemented, preserve the goal of the exception-to
encourage the availability of critically needed trade debt-but, subject to
the caveat discussed below, it is also the most compatible with the
persistent sentiment that one of the aims of the ordinary course of
business defense is to provide a safe harbor for transfers that have a low
probability of having been motivated by the desire to secure a
distributional advantage in bankruptcy
Even were one of these alternatives to be implemented, however, two
serious problems would remain. First, neither of these proposals
explicitly advances what we regard as the primary justification for the
ordinary course of business exception, namely, to ensure the availability
246. See supranote 96.
247. See Lupinacci, supra note 15, at 167-68 (calling for outright repeal of subsection C).

248. See generally Ponoroff,supranote 3, at 1477-84.
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of critically needed trade and other credit essential to continuing
operations. In other words, neither approach offers ironclad security or
even reasonable assurance to the creditor that elects to do business with
the debtor after the onset of financial difficulties that payments received
on account of such credit will be entitled to any special protection from
the trustee's preference recovery authority should a bankruptcy
administration ensue.
Second, neither of the proposals addresses the dilemma created by the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision broadening the ordinary course of
business exception to cover payments made on debts incurred months or
even years prior to the onset of the debtor's financial troubles. Creditors
whose debts were incurred long before the preference period transfers at
issue, or that were intended to provide a source of long-term financing,
ordinarily should not be entitled to have preference period payments
made on their claims differentiated from those of other unsecured
creditors, even where the debt was incurred and the payment made in the
normal course of business between the debtor and creditor. This
conclusion is consistent with the proper meaning of "equality" in the
preference law.249 By contrast, there is a principled basis for
distinguishing the claims of those creditors whose debts were short-term
to begin with and incurred in relatively close proximity to the
preferential transfers made in payment thereon."' Although there is an
undeniable diminishment of the estate as a result of such transfers, these
transactions share in common with other protected transactions25' the
hope that the provision of such current supplies, services, or working
capital needs will make the critical difference in terms of whether the
debtor's slide into bankruptcy can be reversed. The same rationale does
not support extending the scope of the defense to long-term debts or
isolated transactions with non-regular creditors, regardless of whether or
249. See supra text accompanying note 144.
250. See Broome, supra note 3, at 117-18; Ponoroff, supra note 3, at 1491-93.
251. Although § 547(c)(1) & (4) are both premised on the absence of any diminishment of the
estate as a result of a technical preference, they are also intended to serve the goal of encouraging
creditors to continue to do business with a financially distressed debtor. See, e.g., Mosier v. EverFresh Food Co. (In re IRFM, Inc.), 52 F.3d 228, 232 (9th Cir. 1995) (identifying as rationale for
§ 547(c)(4) policy of encouraging creditors to continue doing business with financially troubled
debtors with eye toward avoiding bankruptcy altogether); National Enters., Inc. Liquidating Trust v.
Tee-Lok Corp. (In re National Enters., Inc.), 174 B.R. 429, 433 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994) ("The new
value exception of § 547(c)(4) embodies that same purpose [as the exceptions in § 547(c)(1) & (2)]
of encouraging creditors to continue to deal with an unhealthy debtor."). The exception for purchase
money loans made during the preference period is even more clearly based on the same policy. See,
e.g., Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual 7-35 (3d ed. 1992) (citing
encouragement of credit to enable debtor to acquire new assets as purpose of exczption).
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not the payments occur in the ordinary course and happen to comport
with prevailing industry norms.
In sum, in the absence of any requirement imposing some temporal
connection between the incurring of the debt and the preferential
payment, the exception in section 547(c)(2) becomes a vehicle for
bootstrapping the issue of preferential motive squarely back into the
analysis. 2 Leaving undisturbed normal financial relations is alone an
inadequate justification for any preference exception. It is in the nature of
a preference law to disturb normal financial relations. Expansion of the
exception to regular installment payments on long-term debt severely
erodes the equality objective of the preference law. Preference recovery
becomes the exception rather than the rule. Requiring proof of
compliance with industry standards as an additional element of the
defense admittedly stems the tide to an extent, but it does so in a purely
capricious manner. That is to say, while it may operate to deny the
shelter of the exception in a certain number of cases that otherwise would
have qualified for protection, there is no assurance that those cases
involve the sorts of transactions that fall within the original design of the
exception. In the process, the objective approach indefensibly moves the
ordinary course of business defense even further away from that original
purpose.
Obviously, the most direct solution to this second issue would be to
limit the exception to suppliers of the kind of routine, short-term credit
that is necessary to maintain ongoing, daily operations. Because of the
practical difficulties involved in attempting to draft an exception
explicitly tied to the character of the credit or the type of creditor
(difficulties that apparently accounted for the forty-five day limitation in
the original Code version of section 547(c)(2)),253 the second best
solution would be to reintroduce in every case some sort of a maximum
time limit between the payment and the origination of the debt as a
condition to the creditor's entitlement to invoke the ordinary course of
business defense. In fact, we would support such a change, whether
involving the original forty-five day rule or some variation on that
themeY4 As a matter of practical politics, however, we concede that at
252. In short, the only other plausible justification for protecting such transactions is the policy of
finality and repose. However, that policy is equally served by a preference law that recognizes no
exceptions. See Tabb, supranote 3, at 1027-29.
253. See Countryman, supra note 3, at 769 (suggesting that draftsmen must have despaired of
trying to define "intensely undefined" term "trade debt").
254. See, e.g., Ponoroff, supranote 3, at 1492-94 (calling for reintroduction of either original 45day requirement or some similar variation creating temporal connection between debt and payment).
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this stage in the game, with the formidable array of interests aligned
against it, it is probably too late to expect realistically that any proposal
involving an across-the-board dismantling of the change made to section
547(c)(2) in 1984 would have any hope for enactment-just as we
consider unrealistic the call for the outright elimination of subsection C.
Thus, to achieve the overall objective of tailoring the scope of the
defense to coincide with those cases where its principal rationale is most
directly implicated, any reform proposal for section 547(c)(2) must
include a proxy provision for the old forty-five day rule to limit the
protection of the exception to those creditors willing to do business with
debtors operating on the edge of bankruptcy. This recognition leads us to
offer not necessarily what might be our ideal proposal for reform of the
ordinary course of business defense, but rather a proposal that we believe
addresses the most serious flaws in the current version of the exception
and yet might still be, if not wholly acceptable, then at least
unobjectionable to a sufficient number of interested constituencies so as
to hold out a realistic prospect for enactment.
VI. A PRACTICAL PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Bearing in mind the goal of reformulating the ordinary course of
business defense in a manner that expands its application with respect to
transactions occurring in the shadow of insolvency and yet still
constrains the exception from running roughshod over the rule, we would
propose that section 547(c)(2) be amended to read as follows:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer(2) to the extent such transfer was(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs
of the debtor and the transferee; and
(C) if such transfer is made with respect to a debt incurred more
than 60 days priorto such transfer,then either(i) made according to ordinary business terms as
evidenced by the written agreements of the parties,
unless no such agreements exist, in which case as
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evidenced by the transferee'spast dealings with other
debtors; or
(ii) made on account of a debt incurredby the debtor after
the transferee had reasonable cause to believe that the
debtorwas insolvent.
To begin with, it should be noted that under this proposal, subsections
A and B remain unchanged. Thus, to be entitled to shelter under the
revised rule, at a minimum, the transferee-creditor must establish that the
transfer was "ordinary" as established under the traditional subjective
standard derived principally from past practices and course of dealings
between the parties." Under this version of section 547(c)(2), however,
subsection C would only be applicable if the debt was incurred more than
sixty days prior to the payment in question. This limitation would
operate to burden payments on long-term debt precisely because of the
attenuated connection between those transactions and the essential
justifications for the exception,"6 but it would not exclude such
payments presumptively in the manner that the old forty-five day rule
operated.
In assessing the merits of this proposal it is instructive initially to
consider its impact on the complaints that triggered the elimination in
255. See, e.g., Sulmeyer v. Pacific Suzuki (In re Grand Chevrolet, Inc.), 25 F.3d 728, 732 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that late payments may be ordinary if previous course of conduct between parties
themselves demonstrates that those types of payments were ordinarily made); McCord v. Venus
Foods, Inc. (In re Lan Yik Foods Corp.), 185 B.R. 103, 111 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[The]
subjective inquiry into "ordinariness" suggests some consistency with other business transactions
between the parties rather than a rigid similarity to past transactions); Cocolat, Inc. v. Fisher Dev.,
Inc. (In re Cocolat Inc.), 176 B.Rt 540, 549 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that whether payment
is made in ordinary course of business is judged by subjective standard of what parties themselves
considered ordinary); see also supra note 106-108.
The issue of whether a particular transaction is in the ordinary course of a debtor's business also
arises under §§ 363 and 364 dealing, respectively, with use of property of the estate and post-petition
financing. In those contexts, the courts have generally adopted a two-step inquiry including a
"horizontal dimension" test and a "vertical dimension" test. The former focuses on the transaction
from an industry-wide perspective, while the latter, sometimes referred to as the "creditor's
expectation test," considers whether the transaction subjects a creditor to economic risks of a
different order from those it accepted when it decided to extend credit in the first instance. See
generally In re Roth Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 952 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853
F.2d 700, 704-06 (9th Cir. 1988). Although helpful in a comparative sense, the differences in the
context in which the issue of "ordinary course" arises in these cases, including in particular the fact
that the transactions at issue involve post-petition activities, make the standards developed in these
cases of limited utility in construing comparable claims under the preference statute.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 249-252; see also Miller v. Kibler (In re Winters), 182
B.L 26, 29 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1995) (noting that § 547(c)(2) applies "if the debtor and the transferee
have an ongoing, 'recurring' business relationship").
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1984 of the forty-five day requirement as an element of the ordinary
course of business defense.25 7 First, the additional fifteen days, while
concededly somewhat arbitrary, are intended to respond to complaints
voiced at the time of the 1984 Amendments that the normal payment
cycle in some industries exceeds forty-five days.258 Of course, it is quite
possible that customary trade terms in certain industries may exceed even
sixty days. At some point, however, as the term of the credit increases,
the transaction simply begins to look like something other than a
recurring credit transaction intended to support current operations; that
is, to say, it simply no longer fits within the parameters of the type of
near-cash transaction that the exception, as originally designed,259 was
primarily intended to protect. Moreover, since the revised version of
section 547(c)(2) does not preclude the possibility that under proper
circumstances such longer term transactions might still find protection
under the exception, cutting off the presumption of ordinariness based on
conformity with past practices at sixty days is neither as arbitrary nor
inequitable as it might appear at first blush.
The other complaint voiced by trade creditors in the course of the
discussions culminating in the 1984 Amendments, including trade
creditors whose normal credit terms were less than forty-five days,
related to uncertainty over, and the consequent cost in establishing, when
the debt was deemed to have been incurred and when payment was
deemed to have been made.260 In fact, however, that difficulty was not
unique to section 547(c)(2). Essentially the same issues have always
arisen, and continue to arise, under various other provisions of the
preference law. For example, determination of when the debt was
incurred and when the payment was made is necessary for purposes of
deciding whether the transaction under scrutiny falls within the
" ' Likewise, the same questions
transferee's applicable preference period.26
257. See supranotes 61-72.
258. See Broome, supra note 3, at 101 (citing testimony from hearing conducted during 1981
before Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts to effect that more than 50% of all
industry groups had normal payment periods of 45 days or longer).
259. See supra note 51.
260. For a representative sample of cases struggling with the proper interpretation of the 45-day
rule, see Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Midwest Corp., 873 F.2d 805, 807 (5th Cir. 1989); Durham v.
Smith Metal and Iron Co. (In re Continental Commodities, Inc.), 841 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1988);
Bernstein v. RJL Leasing (In re White River Corp.), 799 F.2d 63 l(10th Cir. 1936); O'Neill v. Nestle
Libbys P.R., Inc. 729 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984); Remes v. Acme Carton Corp. (In re Fasano/Harriss
Pie Co.), 43 B.R. 871 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 71 B.R. 287 (W.D. Micri. 1987).
261. As a threshold matter, there can be no preference to avoid or recover unless the complaining
party can first establish that the debtor engaged in a transfer of property, or of an interest in property,
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must be addressed in ascertaining whether the antecedent debt
requirement in section 547(b)(2) has been satisfied, 262 as well as in
connection with the applicability of the exceptions in sections 547(c)(1)
and (4).263 In all of these contexts, more than a decade of additional case
law development has now established relatively clear standards.2 4
within the applicable period of time during which such transfers are proscribed by the statute: 90
days generally and one year in the case of an insider-transferee. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1994).
The Bankruptcy Code defines transfer to include virtually any form of disposition by the debtor of
property. I1 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1994).
262. The antecedent debt provision is provision requires, of course, that the transfer be made "for
or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made." 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b)(2) (1994); see also 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (1994) (defining "new value for preference
purposes). In general, the focus in determining when a debt is incurred is less upon the point in time
when a binding legal relationship is established between the parties than it is upon when as a result
of that relationship a legal obligation, no matter how remote or contingent, can be said to exist. See
generally Energy Coop., Inc. v. SOCAP Int'l, Ltd. (In re Energy Coop., Inc.), 832 F.2d 997, 1002
(7th Cir. 1987); Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1981); Mendelsohn v. Louis
Frey Co. (In re Moran), 188 B.R. 492,495 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995). Recently, in Southmark Corp. v.
Marley (In re Southmark Corp.), 62 F.3d 104 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 815 (1996),
one of the debtor's subsidiaries' executives received a settlement of his severance rights during the
preference period in the amount of approximately $400,000. The court agreed with the bankruptcy
court's assessment that because the debt was deemed to arise at the time of settlement, and not the
earlier point in time when the employment relationship was established, the debt was not an
antecedent debt subject to avoidance under § 547(b). Id. at 105-06.
263. Section 547(c)(1) contains the exception for substantially contemporaneous exchanges,
whereas § 547(c)(4) provides an offset to the trustee's preference recovery to the extent of any
unsecured new value advanced by the creditor to the debtor after the preference has been made. See
supra note 251. In connection with both of these defenses, it is critical to establish when the
preferential transfer or payment occurred in relation to the new value received from the creditor.
264. For many years, an issue that was a particular source of controversy and confusion was
whether in the case of a payment made by check the transfer occurs at the time the check is delivered
or the time when it is accepted for payment by the drawee bank. In Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S.
393 (1992), the Court ruled that in the case of payment by ordinary check a transfer occurs on the
date of honor, not before. However, the court was careful to limit its holding to § 547(b), and noted,
without expressly deciding the issue, that "[t]hose Courts of Appeal to have considered the issue are
unanimous in concluding that a date of delivery rule should apply to check payments for purposes of
§ 547(c)." Id. at 402 n.9. The legislative history specifically indicates that a "time of delivery" rule is
appropriate for § 547(c)(1) & (2) purposes. See 1978 House Report, supra note 17, at 6329; 124
Cong. Rec. S17414 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); 124 Cong. Rec. 31795,
32400 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (check is equivalent to cash payment, unless dishonored,
both for purposes of section 547(c)(1) and (c)(2)). Although the legislative history does not speak
directly to § 547(c)(4), after Barnhill,the majority of courts have adopted the view that a time of
delivery rule is also appropriate under § 547(c)(4) as well. See, e.g., Jones v. Aristech Chem. Corp.,
157 B.R 720, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993) ("IT]he majority and better view is that the date of receipt
rule determines when a transfer by check occurs under Section 547(c)(4).").
Most courts also agree that timely payments of amount first coming due under an installment loan
are properly treated as having been made on account of a debt incurred at the time the original loan
was made and not the date on which the particular installments come due. See CHG Int'l, Inc. v.
Barclays Bank (In re CHG Int'l, Inc.), 897 F.2d 1479, 1486 (9th Cir 1990); Barash, 658 F.2d at 512.
But see Friedman v. Ginsburg (In re David Jones Builders, Inc.), 129 B.R. 682, 689 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
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Therefore, arguments against inclusion of any kind of temporal
requirement (whether in the form of the original mandatory forty-five
day requirement or the modified sixty-day rule we have proposed)
predicated on the difficulties associated with establishing the time when
the debt was incurred or paid are simply less compelling today than they
were in the early 1980s when the new Code provisions lacked
meaningful judicial interpretation.
The second type of complaint voiced in opposition to the old fortyfive day rule came from the financial markets and the investment
community, which argued that the requirement had the undesirable, and
perhaps unintended,265 effect of eroding the market for short-term
commercial paper, typically issued by large corporations, with maturity
dates exceeding forty-five days. Under this new proposal, the same
objection would be resuscitated with respect to any instrument with a
term of more than sixty days. However, payments on commercial paper
carrying maturities in excess of sixty days, just like payments on any
other sort of debt obligation, could still obtain the benefit of the defense
upon demonstrating compliance with proposed section 547(c)(2)(C)(i).
While the added burden of demonstrating conformity with the terms of
the instrument could still adversely impact companies that prefer to issue
commercial paper with longer maturities, it would not, in the manner of
section 547(c)(2) as originally enacted, eliminate the market entirely. 2
Some chilling effect, which inheres in any commercial system that
incorporates a preference law, should be tolerable, particularly since the
purchasers of such paper carrying longer maturities are in substance
indistinguishable from any other suppliers of unsecured debt financing.
The risk of insolvency and preference recovery simply become part of
1991) (holding that timely payments of interest only, as distinguished from mixed payments of
principal and interest, may be considered as having been given in current exchange transaction for
use of principal, and, thus, not on account of obligation relating back to when loan was originally
closed). This position derives from the view expressed by the Eighth Circuit in Iowa Premium
Service Co. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Iowa Premium Serv. Co.), 695 F.2d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 1982)

(en bane).
265. But see Countryman, supra note 3, at 769 (suggesting that draftsmen of Code recognized and
accepted prospect that their formulation would include all kinds of short-term debt including
payments on commercial paper).
266. See, e.g., Broome, supra note 3, at 104 n. 118. Moreover, if the commercial paper market is
in fact somehow special in the sense that it needs special protection to ensure the steady flow of
badly needed capital to many corporation, the solution lies in a narrowly tailored preference
exception, as at one time had been proposed, and not in the wholesale expansion of the ordinary
course of business exception. See Countryman, supra note 3, at 771-72 (describing bill introduced
by Sen. Dole in 1983 that would have created new exception for payments made on specially backed
commercial paper regardless of its maturity date).
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the cost of credit and, in fact, these creditors are far more likely and able
to adjust the cost of credit to reflect the additional risk than, for
example,
267
debt.
trade
ordinary
of
suppliers
sophisticated
less
the usually
Lastly, the complaints of the providers of installment loans to
consumer debtors were also a factor in the elimination of the old fortyfive day rule.2 6' However, those concerns were ultimately addressed
directly by the adoption of section 547(c)(7) (renumbered (c)(8) by the
1994 Amendments) in 1984.269 Thus, regardless of whether or not the
consumer credit industry is satisfied with the specific terms of that
provision, 270 their complaints are no longer relevant to the discussion of
the manner in which section 547(c)(2) should operate.
As the foregoing illustrates, the instant proposal satisfactorily
responds to the specific concerns that accounted for the elimination of
the forty-five day rule. At the same time, it introduces an obstacle, but
not an impenetrable barrier, for payments made on long-term installment
debt obligations. If the challenged payment is made within sixty days
after the debt was incurred, the creditor need only establish that the debt
and the payment were "ordinary" in relation to past practices between the
parties. Protection of these transactions is warranted because of the
potentially crippling effect that any interruption in the flow of routine,
customary credit transactions can have even on a healthy business. In the
vast majority of these cases, the creditor is innocent of any intention to
gain an advantage in light of the debtor's deteriorating financial
condition. The proximity of the payment to the incurring of the debt
provides sufficient assurance that the obligation was of this ilk so as to
obviate the need for any additional proof. Moreover, the suppliers of
267. The problems of "nonadjusting" unsecured creditors have received increased attention in the
recent literature examining the efficiency of secured financing. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priorityof Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 Yale L.J.
857 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki, The UnsecuredCreditor'sBargain, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1887 (1994).
268. See Broome, supra note 3, at 104-09.
269. Section 547(c)(7) excepts from preference recovery a transfer by "an individual debtor
whose debts are primarily consumer debts" if "the aggregate of all property that constitutes and is
affected by such transfer is less than $600." 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(7) (1994). The term "consumer debt"
is defined in § 101(8).
270. Recently, several courts have ruled that in determining the applicability of the "de minimis"
exception in § 547(c)(8) with respect to any particular transfer, the dollar value of all transfers to the
creditor during the preference period must be aggregated. See, e.g., Electric City Merchandise Co. v.
Hailes (In re Hailes), 77 F.3d 873 (5th Cir. 1996); Christians v. American Express Travel Related
Servs. (In re DjerO, 188 B.R. 586 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995); Alarcon v. Commercial Credit Corp. (In
re Alarcon), 186 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1995). But see Wilkey v. Credit Bureau Sys., Inc. (In re
Clark), 171 B.R. 563 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1994) (holding that $600 exception applies separately to
each transfer).
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such credit can, as a matter of general business practice, continue to
conduct business as usual with their customer base without incurring
what would doubtless be the prohibitive costs of investigating the
debtor's financial well-being in advance of each transaction, and without
concern that the permissibility of any special accommodations made to a
particular customer would be later judged based on the unrelated
practices of their competitors.2
In the event that the payment is on account of a debt originating more
remote than sixty days from the date of transfer, the connection between
the goals of the exception and the transaction under scrutiny are more
attenuated. Thus, amended subsection C would require either evidence of
internal conformity or specific demonstration that the payment was made
in respect of the type of credit that it is the policy of the preference law to
encourage. Under the first prong of revised subsection C, entailing proof
of what we refer to as "internal conformity," the court would simply be
required to examine whether the debtor and creditor adhered to the
specific terms of their own contracts or, absent a written agreement, with
the creditor's practices with other similar debtors.272 This requirement
should provide adequate assurance of the absence of special deals
without the necessity of incurring the expense, and, more importantly,
without introducing the inevitable uncertainty associated with proving or
disproving conformity with prevailing industry standards. 3 It also
ensures that the inquiry under subsection C is not merely duplicative of
the analysis under subsection A and B.
The requirements of proposed section 547(c)(2)(C)(i) are
distinguishable from the current subsection B because a payment may be
271. See Ponoroff, supra note 3, at 1492-93 (pointing out that relatively small size and routine
nature of most recurring, short-term credit arrangements make it uneconomical to monitor closely
debtor's financial situation).
272. This inquiry would permit the creditor to establish that the payment was made according to
ordinary business terms by demonstrating that it was similar to its payment practices involving other
same-industry customers. This proof is essentially the same test offered by the creditor in In re
Midway Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 792, 797-98 (7th Cir. 1995), and rejected by the Seventh Circuit. See
supra text accompanying notes 221-222.
273. Although it is far from a perfect way to ensure the absence of improper motive, it is no less
effective than the industry terms approach. See supra text accompanying note 234. For a good
example of a circumstance where this proposed approach would yield a result different than the
current industry standards approach, see Dery v. Detroit Edison (In re Dobbs, Inc.), No. 94-CV71689-DT, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16303, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 1995), wherein the transferee
argued that the existence of a contractual provision allowing late payment was sufficient to satisfy
subsection C. It should be noted, however, that in that case, the creditor would also have a problem
satisfying the subjective prong of ordinary course under subsection B. Analysis required by that
provision is not in anyway altered by the present proposal.
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within the ordinary course of affairs of the debtor and transferee, yet be
contrary to the terms of the contract (or vice versa). Interpreting
subsection C in this manner also supports the goal of protecting normal
financial relations by assuring that parties are not underhanded in their
dealings or making sham contracts in order to deviate from regular
business dealings. On the other hand, because it focuses on the internal
relationship between the creditor and debtor, or, at most, the creditor's
other debtors, lack of collusion is established without sacrificing the
ability to predict, particularly at the point in crucial time that the credit is
extended, what proof will be sufficient to shield later payments from
preference recovery. An industry standards approach, by contrast, is
unpredictable for creditors and that fact ultimately hurts debtors.
Accordingly, we would resist preserving even a tertiary role for industry
terms in cases of last resort.274
The alternative standard in proposed section 547(c)(2)(C)(ii) involves
taking what has historically been an element of an avoidable
preference275 and standing it on its head. Specifically, instead of the
trustee establishing the existence of some form of bad motive as an
essential element of a voidable preference, the creditor would be
required, as a condition to being permitted to retain the preference as an
ordinary course payment, to show good motive at the time the original
debt was incurred. Of course, for these purposes "good motive" is
defined in terms of the creditor's conscious willingness to provide lifesustaining extensions of new credit after the debtor has encountered
financial difficulties. If the creditor can in fact shoulder this added
burden, the reasons for imposing a time limitation between the incurring
of the debt and the payment simply become less urgent. Although, as a
practical matter, the weaker the temporal connection between the debt
and the payment, the less likely it is that the creditor will actually have
had, or will be able to prove, the requisite state of mind, there is no
compelling reason to deny the creditor at least the opportunity to try to
make the case. At the same time, this requirement should serve to make
the proposal more palatable than if the bar after sixty days were absolute.
Proposed section 547(c)(2)(C)(ii) would also be of particular utility in
a case in which a creditor varied its payment terms, both from the terms
of its written contracts and industry standards, in order to accommodate a
financially flailing debtor. In this respect, the proposal actually goes
274. For an alternative proposal that eliminates the role for industry terms, see Thabit, supra note
15, at 506-09.
275. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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further than the original version of section 547(c)(2) in promoting the
primary goal of the ordinary course of business exception. At the same
time, it provides a check on collusive behavior without introducing the
complexity of an industry standards approach.
Finally, because any transfer that finds protection under section
547(c)(2) has diminished the distributable estate, and, therefore, done
violence to the strong equality-based objectives of the preference law,
the sixty-day limitation in proposed section 547(c)(2)(C)(ii), just like the
industry standards interpretation of present subsection C, operates to
constrain the potential reach of the exception. It does so, however, in a
manner that we believe is far more principled, and administratively
manageable, than the one-dimensional industry standards approach.
Specifically, under this proposal, the exception would discriminate
among cases based on factors sensitive to the purposive objectives of the
statute, and not considerations that serve those interests in the random
fashion of industry terms.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, we believe that the phrases "ordinary
course of business" and "ordinary business terms" should not be
construed to require the examination of practices beyond the specific
debtor-creditor relationship, even in extreme cases where there is no
prior history and no written understandings or agreements between the
parties. In those instances, the determination of "ordinariness" should be
limited to an examination of the defendant-creditor's practices vis-ei-vis
its other debtors, rather than requiring congruence with industry-wide
standards that are relevant only fortuitously, if at all.
The introduction of a new standard that restores the pre-1984 purely
subjective analysis for payments on debts incurred within the preceding
sixty days induces creditors as a matter of general business practice to
continue to deal with distressed debtors. In the case of other payments,
where justification for the defense is less clearly in focus, the added
burden of establishing one of the two prongs of redrafted subsection C
ensures either the normalcy of the transaction in more relevant terms than
an industry standards test, or that the policy of encouraging the extension
of credit to troubled debtors is in fact implicated in the transaction by
virtue of the creditor's awareness of the debtor's precarious financial
situation. Thus, for those preoccupied with the issue, there is relative
comfort that the transaction is not the product of a collusive deal between
the debtor and the favored creditor, and yet the chances for survival
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"without a costly detour through or a humbling ending in, the sticky web
of bankruptcy"2'76 are improved.
In urging this position, we do not wish to be understood as endorsing
Wolas. It is simply now that that decision is on the books, we think it is
unreasonable to expect that the Pandora's box opened by that decision
can be restored to its original closed and locked position. Therefore, we
are recommending that we use the occasion to fix the mess over proof of
industry standards which has been spawned in the aftermath of that case
to also limit in a principled way the reach of the ordinary course of
business exception in cases involving transfers on long-term debt
obligations. Because of the sensitive interaction between the two issues,
neither ought to be addressed without full consideration of effect on the
other.
In the final analysis, the ordinary course of business defense serves a
legitimate commercial purpose, although that purpose is poorly served by
section 547(c)(2) as currently articulated and understood in the case law.
By eliminating the examination of industry standards in the
determination of "ordinary business terms," and distinguishing between
payments on long-term and recurring, customary and other short-term
credit transactions, the defense can be rehabilitated to carry out its
intended purpose in a more effective manner than is presently the case.
However, until that rehabilitation is accomplished, the ordinary course of
business exception will remain disturbingly at odds with the goals of the
preference law, and both trustees and creditors will be forced to squander
limited resources and, in the process, waste valuable judicial time
litigating issues that relate tangentially, at best, to the advancement of
those goals.

276. Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc.), 18
F.3d 217, 219 (3d Cir. 1994).

